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ORIGINS AND CURRENT FLORIDA STATUS OF
THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
ALTO ADAmS AND GEORGE JOHN Mnum

Consuetudo fugit, breve manet*
Well did Oxford's renowned Sir Henry Maine observe, over half a
century ago, ". . . that substantive law has at first the look of being
gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure . . . ." Symmetry
of propositions comes later, if at all; the practical remedies are the important thifig. The corollary is that once a particular form, together
with its label, 2 becomes familiar it tends to acquire a certain sanctity,
with the result that substantive changes are channeled through it if
possible. In any event changes will occur; the desires of the enduring
community will not be thwarted for long. As these changes pour
through the old channel, that channel itself is affected. It may expand gracefully, thereby maintaining intact its original course even
as it leads to more and somewhat different anchorages.3 Or the mere
label, fortified by having been recorded on a chart, may later be
applied to a swash that little resembles the main channel. 4 Or the old
*[Editors' Note: We have not been able to trace this one, but believe that
it may be attributed to a chafice remark of Lord Mildew over a glass of port in
the Inns of Court, circa 1600].
1
EAnLY LAW AND CusToM 389 (1883). The full quotation is: "So great is
the ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice, that
substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices
of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope
of its technical forms."
2
See McIlwain, Some Illustrations of the Influence of Unchanged Names for
Changing Institutions in INTRPRErTATONS OF MODERN LEGAL Pmosopmxs 484
(Sayre ed. 1947).
3
E.g., the writ of prohibition.
4
E.g., the writ of habeas corpus in its various forms. Cf. HOLMES, THnE
CozasoN LAvw 1-2 (1881): "The substance of the law at any given time pretty

[421]
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bed may prove too narrow for the growing substantive flood, which
gradually cuts a new path, or finds a more flexible existing one, and
leaves the original channel to silt up from disuse.5
Our point is that procedure must be examined in its context to be

fully understood. One may perhaps say that the prerogative writ of
certiorari still exists and therefore is important, while the prerogative writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto6 is virtually unknown to

the modern practitioner and therefore is unimportant. Even after
conceding this assertion, however, the fact remains that the reasons
for the endurance of the one and the disappearance of the other are
themselves significant to the study of how to use today those prerogative writs that remain active. This statement is doubly appropriate

in any state that has adopted, as has Florida, the common and statute
law of England of a general and not of a local nature down to July 4,
1776.7
Some ninety years ago Maine shrewdly suggested:"

"The reason why one legal conception continues so long to cover
several conceptions, and one technical phrase to do instead of
several, is doubtless that practical changes are accomplished in
the law of primitive societies long before men see occasion to
notice or name them."
The writs under discussion constitute a striking example of Maine's
genuis for apt generalization; in fact the process he describes continued well past the period in which England could be called primitive in any normal usage of the term. Before flipping rapidly the
nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depend very much upon its past."
5
E.g., the replacement of the assize of nuisance by action on the case, traced
with charactcristic scholarship by McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the
Early Common Law, 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948).
6
This writ, which forbade proceeding without the consent of the king, was
a favorite of Sir Francis Bacon. Other prerogative writs, now virtually obsolete
in England, are ne exeat regno, discussed in 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 374 (1950),
and scire facias for the purpose of rescinding royal grants and franchises.
7
See Legis., Sketch of the Evolution of Florida Law, 3 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
74 (1950).
8
ANcIENT LAw 343-344 (new ed. 1930).
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pages of English legal history, however, let us first state what we are
attempting in this article, and let us then take a preliminary glance
at the extraordinary writs as a class.
One is sorely tempted, in charting an area as extensive and as full
of rocks and shoals as that pierced by the prerogative writs, to sound
each old channel individually, especially in those instances in which
outstanding hydrographers disagree. For example, is the capias but
another name for habeas corpus in one of its many forms? 9 How
much of the writ system did William the Conqueror bring over from
Normandy and merely adapt to his fresh kingdom? How close are
the words mandatum est, and likewise the various terms signifying
"certify,"' 0 to the more fully developed writs of mandamus and
certiorari of a later age?
Any such investigation, however, must await a different type of
article. This one is an introduction, and a panoramic view. It is not
an exhaustive analysis either of any single writ or of any single period.
Neither is it a treatise. The attempt here is to sketch the background
of the five extraordinary writs and their individual evolutions, with
a few words about equity and the writ of injunction, then to summarize their current status in Florida law, and then to complete the
Djenks, in The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64 (1902), suggests
that it is; Sir John Charles Fox, in his Process of Imprisonment at Common Law,
39 L.Q. RBv. 46 (1923), is firmly of the opinion that it is not. See also 9
HornswoTH, HSTORY OF ENcLrsH LAw 108-109 (1938); Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAw. B. REv. 92, 112-115
(1938). The terminological distinction is observed in, e.g., The Eyre of Kent,
6 EDw. H (1313), 24 SELDEN Soc'y 62 (1909): Precepturm fuit vicecomiti
Sussexie quod caperet J. de W. & W. de R. & eos salvo &c ita quod haberet
corpora eorum hic coram justiciariis itinerantibusad respondendum . .. ." The
sheriff, that is, was ordered to "arrest" I and W and "keep them in safe custody,
etc., so that he should have their bodies here before the justices in eyre to
answer . . ." Why the two expressions, if capias and habeas corpus are
equivalent?
' 0 To take an example once again from The Eyre of Kent, supra note 9, at
67-68, we find an accused pleading, in defense to a charge of homicide, prior
acquittal before Roger de Brabazon and his fellow king's justices. The report
continues: "Ideo mandatum est eidem R. quod scrutatis rotulis suis certificet
hic . . . de acquietandia predicta ...
."
The command is hardly the writ of
mandamus; and the order to Roger "that after checking his rolls he certify here
... regarding the alleged acquittal" is in no sense a transfer of the trial before
Roger, although it is a direction to certify as to the record.
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Florida picture by analyzing the rather rare constitutional writ of
injunction as used by the Supreme Court of Florida. Case citations
are held to a minimum; and at least some of what is said will appear
elementary to many a practitioner. Our plea is that law students
should on occasion be given consideration, even in articles. In the
process of summarizing we have borrowed heavily from a large
number of other writers, including those that present in this issue, in
detail and with full citation of original authorities, the individual
extraordinary writs and injunction as they function in Florida today.
PRELIMINARY GLANCE AT THE EXTRAORDINARY WRITS

Writs in general were, of course, originally so named because they
were written. In Norman England something written, especially when
attested or sealed, was of especial significance in an age when writing
of any sort was as rare as good writing is today. Certiorari, habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto acquired their
vague Florida designation "extraordinary" simply because they were
out of the ordinary. This term, however, if it means anything means
too much; the writ of injunction has on occasion been blessed with
this high-sounding name in Florida,1 and even the writ of error might
in its infancy have aspired to such a title.
In England these five distinctive channels of procedure were known
as the prerogative writs. They were not so designated either at birth
or in their youth, however; and in any event this characterization is
no more nearly accurate than is their Florida nickname. Their issuance
was not confined to the king alone, and they were not employed exclusively for his benefit. Nevertheless they did come to be closely
associated with the king's justice, which was alleged to be superior
to all the other forms of justice then being administered and which,
rough and ready though it was at times, came to be popularly acclaimed as superior. Hence the English designation of the most
powerful of the royal procedural forms.
Two writers have attempted to describe the prerogative writs as a
class: Edward Jenks and S. A. de Smith. The former says "There is
"See, e.g., Clark v. Kreidt, 145 Fla. 1, 5, 199 So. 333, 335 (1940); Willis
v. Hathaway, 95 Fla. 608, 620, 117 So. 89, 93 (1928). The context indicates,
however, that "extraordinary" is used merely to indicate that injunction is not
lightly granted.
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no definition."'1 2 The latter concluded only a year ago that ".... no
lawyer has even been able to give a satisfactory answer to the question: What is a prerogative writ?"13 These observations do not doom
expository efforts to failure, however, because each of the five writs
is, at least in itself, amenable to analysis. Furthermore, a panoramic
approach, historical as well as comparative, may yet yield a common
denominator or two. Accordingly we turn to English legal history
with a view to reinstating these five writs in their original settings
for purposes of examination.
OmGINs Ai

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTAORDINARY WITs

Historical explanation of legal phenomena does not justify continuance of the outmoded, despite the antipathy of the legal mind to
changes; but, perhaps even more than in other fields of knowledge,
the case in the law stubbornly refuses to reveal its full significance
until it is visualized as a segment of a trend. This attitude is vital in
approaching the extraordinary writs. They evolved spasmodically,
incoherently in a logical sense yet quite coherently in a practical
sense, individually, and belligerently -through several eras in which
the slogan was every writ for himself and oblivion take the hindmost.
The major ones kept afloat in the turbulent ocean of English governmental and legal development, however, even when some of them
were trading broadsides with the others. And each affected and was
affected vitally by the political currents of each age in that evolution.
Broad HistoricalBackground
The short-lived dynasty of King Canute in the first half of the
eleventh century, and its Anglo-Saxon precursors and immediate successors, are of interest for our purposes here in the sole respect that
the origins of the common law were Vaguely discernible, albeit in
blunt Teutonic form. The law was "common" in the lesser sense that
it was customary. But it was not "common" in the sense of realmwide extension, because there was no single realm; and it was not
"common law" as distinct from equity, because there was no call for
'2jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32

YALE L.J. 528, 583
(1928).
13 S. A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAmB. L.J. 40, 56 (1951).
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supplementing, from outside, a system that was itself just beginning
to grow. The prerogative writs had not yet appeared.
When, however, Harold perished at Hastings in 1066, centralization truly began under William I, soldier, statesman and legislator,
with a flair for administration. The royal judges did not speed into
prominence - great institutions are not developed in haste even
though in precise form their appearance may be sudden - but the
gradual subsumption of varying local customs under royal control,
and the selective process inherent in the gathering into one headquarters of the manifold local data, gave William I and his two Norman successors a rare opportunity. Although the incompetent Stephen
somewhat dissipated their achievements, fortunately the first of the
Plantaganet line, Henry II, resumed the steady progress of his maternal great-grandfather.
Henry II, able soldier that he was, nevertheless concentrated his
tremendous energy on fiscal, administrative and judicial reforms.
Despite the fact that he spent half of his 1154-1189 reign in the
portion of his empire across the Channel, he nevertheless builded so
firmly in the law that his basic structure survived swashbuckling
Richard I, useless John, of Magna Carta notoriety, and infant Henry
III. When, years after the end of Henry's personal rule, his son Edward I succeeded to the throne while off on a crusade, the maintenance of the common law became assured. Known as the English
Justinian, Edward labored diligently between 1274, when he was
crowned, and 1307. Even the subsequent, futile Hundred Years War
with the French, and the destructive War of the Roses at home,
failed to undo his handiwork.
When the strong yet tactful House of Tudor took the helm, under
Henry VII in 1485, an exhausted and disgusted nation welcomed
with a feeling of relief the return to strong, unified government and
the concentration of future efforts on the western side of the Channel
and on sea power. Legal battles there were, as equity and other rival
jurisdictions blossomed under royal cultivation; but English law remained definitely English, rather than Roman or canon. As one of
the great legal historians of all time, Cambridge's Professor Maitland,
14
puts it:

"The qualities that saved English law when the day of trial came
141ntroduction to 17 SEmerN Soc'y xviii (1903).
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in the Tudor age were not vulgar common sense and the reflexion of the layman's unanalyzed instincts: rather they were strict
logic and high technique, rooted in the Inns of Court, rooted in
the Year Books, rooted in the centuries. There is little enough
of crude common sense in Coke upon Littleton. What, so we
take it, was distinctive of English law at the end of the middle
age was the elaboration of rough native material into a highly
technical, but at the same time durable, scheme of terms and
concepts."
Nature and Role of Writs
In the warp of the tough fabric of the common law lay the writs,
not the least of which were those later to be hailed as prerogative.
The writs in general were classified in rough fashion by Bracton,
whose monumental De Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAngliae appeared
around 1250, as either original or judicial. Indeed, the practitioner
before the royal tribunals, while not precisely an attorney in our
modern sense, relied heavily on the Registrum Brevium: tam Originalium quam Judicialium5 in the Norman reigns; and by the time
of Edward I the Year Books, forerunners of our modem law reports,
had made their appearance to complement the writ formbooks with
vivid accounts, in the Anglo-French vernacular, of what actually
happened to these writs in court- reports that bring to life William
de Bereford, Edward II's bluff, practical chief justice, and those
great masters of oral pleading such as Serjeants Passeley, Herle and
6
Toudeby.1
15The BREnsra

or Wmrs:

OmmN~A. AS WELL AS JuDIcLAL was in essence

a type of formbook, or more probably two types. The judicial writs issued
out of the courts of law; the original writs issued out of the king's chancery.
The REGIsTRm oF OmuciNAL Wnrrs grew for three centuries or more and expanded
from 10 or 12 pages to some 700. Whenever a newly created form for commencing an action became accepted as an effective writ it made its way into
most of the copies of the REGIsTm. Says Maitland in The History of the
Register of Original Writs, 8 HAnv. L. REv. 97, 167, 212, at 105 (1889),
".. . we should think of the Register as a type to which diverse registers
belonging to diverse masters and clerks more or less accurately conformed."
The cursitores, or clerial de cursu, issued the routine writs "of course'; new
writs were drafted by the masters in chancery, and probably by the clerks at
times. Established writs were not copied meticulously, and the various copies
of the REGs-TE accordingly differed.
10
The Year Books were probably not official, but rather collections of notes
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A writ, or breve, is succinctly defined by Jenks as ". . . a short
written command issued by a person in authority, and 'tested' or
sealed by him in proof of its genuineness." 17 Then as now, the
national treasury invariably professed to need more funds and
4lways looked to further taxes rather than to ways of curtailing
unnecessary expenditures. Taxation based on land was the chief
source of revenue; land accordingly merited protection; and so
both land law and criminal law early became important. Furthermore, fines and forfeitures were a handy source of revenue to the
authority holding court. The shire court, the hundred court, the
seignorial courts, and the other sporadic local fora for administering
justice were impeded by their archaic pleading, their largely "physical" methods of proof,' and their inability in many instances to
insure execution of judgment. The king offered far better machinery,
as well as proof by sworn local "jurors" deciding of their personal
knowledge at the grand and petty assizes. He saw an opportunity
to turn an honest penny or two into the royal coffers at the same
time. For a fee the applicant could obtain a writ out of the king's
chancery - not to be confused with the much later chancery jurisdiction of the courts as we know it today- and soon a writ came
to signify a royal writ exclusively. Even so, however, it applied to
a multitude of activities, only a portion of which were judicial.
The distinction between an original writ issuing out of the king's
chancery and a judicial writ issuing from the court in which a given
proceeding had been instituted became highly significant at a
later period, when common law judges began to assert their independence1 9 and when the imprint of the great seal, on an original
writ, was not readily available at a price within reason.
Bracton subdivides original writs into brevia de cursu and brevia
magistralia. While all judicial writs were discretionary with the
particular court, original writs issued either "of course" if in common
"made by learners for learners, by apprentices for apprentices," says Maitland
in his Introduction to 17 SELDEN Soc'y xiii (1903).
17Jenks, supra note 12, in his opening sentence.
' 8 E.g., trial by battle or by ordeal.
19 Not until 1700 were the commissions to judges issued Quamdiu se bene
gesserint, 12 & 18 WiLL., c. 2, §8; before then they were in a strict sense the

king's servants, and not infrequently felt compelled to do as they were told.
Some, however, like Sir Edward Coke, L.C.J., did not hesitate to risk the
royal ire.
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form,20 or as a matter of grace, or discretion, whenever a new

remedy was needed and a fee could be produced. Hence it may
be said that the growth of the early common law was in large
measure the expansion of the original writs. Coupled with improvements in methods of proof, steady use of judicial writs, and teeth
in execution, this process spelled the triumph of the common law
over rival systems. Indeed, so prolific were the early chancery
clerks that in the Provisions of Oxford in 1258 we find the chancellor limited to the extent "Ke ilne enselera nut bref fors bref
de curs sanz le commandement le rei, e de sun cunseil ke serra
present."'- Nevertheless, the "writs of course" could still be issued
automatically; and the king and his council were not averse to
further creative draftsmanship provided it was supervised from
above.
The earliest royal judges came from the ranks of statesmen; and
when, a bit later, professional judges who began as royal clerks
were promoted to the bench, they were still ecclesiastics. Hubert
Walter, for example, who probably wrote the pioneer legal Tractatus
attributed to Justiciar Glanvil in the reign of Henry II, served as
both chancellor and archbishop of Canterbury. Chancellors remained churchmen until Wolsey, cardinal with an eye on the papacy,
incurred the wrath of Henry VIII for permitting religious niceties
to interfere with connubial variety.
In an era when the lawyer, as he gradually made his appearance,
was to the ecclesiastic an even worse upstart than the administrator
is to the attorney in recent decades, 22 it is not surprising to find
special and powerful ecclesiastical courts in full operation. The
bar, headed by its famous serjeants-at-law, achieved its full organization and gained its prestige but slowly; and the four great Inns of
Court, 23 where the apprentices were trained in the common law,
were not organized until the fourteenth century. Meanwhile Oxford
and Cambridge, beginning their illustrious careers at the close of
20
See
21

note 15 supra.
"That he shall issue no writ other than a writ of course without the command of the king and of his council present." An alternative translation "and
of his council, which shall be present" hardly squares with the practice of the
earlier kings, although the council usually was on hand.
22
See Pound's Introduction to LAw In AcTIoN (ed. "amicus curiae" 1947),
especially at xi-xiii.
23
See the delightful address of former Solicitor General Beck, The Inns of
Court, 2 FLA. STATE B u ASS'N L.J., June 1928, p. 38.
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the twelfth century and emphasizing Plato and Aristotle, offered
some legal instruction, but the subject was Roman law. Not until
eighteenth-century Sir William Blackstone, first Vinerian professor
of law at Oxford and arranger of the Codrington law library, were
lectures given at the universities on English law.

Equity versus Common Law
An adequate sketch of the prerogative writs requires at least a
glance at equity and its favorite weapon, injunction. Equity "followed the law," both in time and in the selection of its subjectmatter. More interesting still, perhaps, is the fact that it followed
the common law in its manner of evolution. Both went through
the stages, which one might almost term standard, of inception
prompted by a need for better practical machinery and scope in
judicial administration, expansion encouraged by creation of more
remedies and their favorable reception, consolidation over nearly
a century into fixed principles, crystallization and complacency as
hardening of the arteries developed, and stultification and dissatisfaction as technicalities and delay finally overshadowed substantive
results.
The common law was born in the twelfth century, continued to
expand through part of the thirteenth, was consolidated in that
century and the early portion of the fourteenth, and then paid the
price of crystallization in the late fourteenth and fifteenth.
With the Tudors the star of equity rose; and under the Stuarts
its light outshone the common law. Cromwell's protectorate gave
equity a setback; but only with the flight of James II in 1688 and
the acceptance by William III and Mary of the invitation to take
the helm did the common law regain a firm footing. A few years
previously, under Charles II, Chief Baron Hale of the Exchequer
and that ardent royalist Lord Chancellor Nottingham had given
the first real impetus to the consolidation of equity as a system of
case law. Later, Lord Hardwicke in the eighteenth century, and
Lord Eldon in the first three decades of the nineteenth, crystallized
equity into definite principles and doctrines. The advantages of
certainty and continuity were achieved, but technical dry rot set
in along with them. To borrow once again from Sir Henry Maine,
24
in his brilliant comparison of Roman and English equity:
24

ANCMNT LAW

73 (new ed. 1930).
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"Each of them tended, and all such systems tend, to exactly
the same state in which the old common law was when Equity
first interfered with it."
Neither common lawyers nor equity lawyers could forget the scars
of that titanic seventeenth-century struggle between Sir Edward Coke,
the lord chief justice, 25 and Lord Ellesmere, the chancellor, ably
seconded by Attorney General Bacon. In the process the prerogative
writ de non procedendo rege inconsulto28 lost its existence for all
practical purposes in 1615; Coke, having infuriated the king by smashing this promising implement, lost the chief justiceship a year later;
Bacon, riding the crest of royal favor, obtained and yet soon lost the
chancellorship as his lavish personal spending and inability to refuse
gifts from grateful suitors caught up with him; James I lost the popularity bequeathed him by the Tudors; Charles I lost his head; the
star chamber 27 and the ecclesiastical court of high commission 28 lost
their legal lives, and the lesser court of requests received a fatal
blow; administrative law and Roman law, victorious on the Continent,
lost their battle to take over England; and the nation itself lost many
valuable years in bitter internal war.
The common law, fighting for survival, again expanded in some
respects, notably when with the deft steering of Lord Mansfield in
the eighteenth century it took over the law merchant jurisdiction
from admiralty; but equity consistently maintained the upper hand
over its great rival. To be sure, both common law and equity finally
developed a modus vivendi; but the ensuing peace generated complacency. When that most English of Englishmen, Charles Dickens,
embarked on his crusade of satire early in the nineteenth century, the
strict pleading, the fatality of one false procedural step, and the
inflexibility of the forms of action in the common law, together with
the delay, the never-ending expense, and the general lethargy of
25

Despite popular misconception, Sir Edward Coke, properly pronounced
"Cook," was neither a peer of the realm nor a lord of appeal in ordinary; indeed,
he was probably the last person in the realm to whom James I would have
awarded a peerage. He arrogated to himself the title "lord chief justice,"
however; and this fact probably explains the confusion. Bacon, on the other
hand,
was made Lord Verulam late in life.
20
See note 6 supra.
2716 C~AI. I, C. 10 (1640).
2816 CAn. I, c. 11 (1640).
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equity, had set the stage for the third great wave of legal advance
in the form of the statute and its handmaiden, the administrative
regulation. The powder of dissatisfaction was there; Bentham, disgusted both with Oxford and with Blackstone's lectures at Lincoln's
Inn, had merely to touch a match to it, with his apparently profound
but to this day undefined philosophy of the greatest good for the
greatest number, and with the weapon of mass legislation.
Individual Prerogative Writs
Let us now chart the strategic advance of each of the surviving
prerogative writs as it maneuvered about individually in this everchurning sea of battle.
Certiorari. The seemingly though not genuinely Latin word certiorari, and the alternative term certificari, served from very early
times as the label for numerous demands made by the king for information. At first the writ was used to obtain for royal perusal various
records, primarily administrative and fiscal; the king and his curia
regis quite naturally wished to be "certified" of such matters, either
by the original record or by a certification of its contents. When the
record involving a pending proceeding involving dispute as to legal
what
rights alleged to exist already, then, as Jenks pointedly asks, "...
more easy than for the authority to which the record was handed to
continue the proceedings itself?" 29 Certiorari constituted a far better
method than prohibition of checking an inferior tribunal that, while
admittedly cognizant of the subject matter, was nevertheless illequipped to try the case.
Certiorari was used in the thirteenth century to remove causes in
inferior courts of record to the royal courts at Westminster. 30 From
the fourteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, according to de Smith,
the writ served to obtain information for administrative purposes, to
supervise proceedings of inferior courts of specialized jurisdiction,
to remove coroners' inquisitions and indictments into the king's bench,
29

Jenks, supra note 12, at 529. At 532 he finds certiorari classified in the
REcIsTFma as both original and judicial. According to 9 HALsButy, LAWS OF
ENGLAND 874 n.(1) (2d ed. Hailsham, 1933), however, certiorari issued out of
the king's chancery only, as an original writ, and the record was sent by the
chancery, by mittimus, to the appropriate royal court for action.
30
de Smith, supra note 13, at 45.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 1
ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS

and to bring for a variety of purposes the judicial records and other
formal documents of inferior courts before the common law or
chancery courts. 3 ' Among such purposes was the "return" of the
remainder of the record below when diminution, that is, incompleteness, was alleged.3 2 The issuance of certiorari and habeas corpus
cum causa in combination proved highly effective in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, especially in order to remove into the king's
bench or chancery many of the causes and parties dealt with in the
capital by the locally powerful "custom of London."33
After Cromwell numerous administrative duties were assigned to
new ad hoc authorities, and local government acquired a large
measure of autonomy. Parliamentary direction by statute was of
some influence, but the strong, direct control exercised by the
executive branch under the Tudors and early Stuarts was gone. Accordingly the prerogative writs, especially certiorari, assumed an
even broader scope. 34 In 1700 Chief Justice Holt expanded certiorari
still further by stating that it lay to review disciplinary decisions of
the censors of the college of physicians, this function being quasijudicial. 35 As de Smith aptly summarizes the subsequent demand
for the writ: 36
31id. at 47. Typical illustrations appear in Coram Rege Roll No. 137, m. 21
(Trin. 1293), 57 SELmE- Soc'y 147 (1938); No. 138, m. 14 (Mich. 1293),
57 S.ENm Soc'y 154 (1938). In the latter, King Edward I commands his
treasurer and chamberlains as follows: "Quia quibusdam certis de causis
cerciorari volumus super recordo et processu loquele que fuit Thoma de Weyland"; that is, "Because for some definite reasons we wish to be certified as to
the record and process of the suit before Thomas of Weyland...
32lbid.
33
Cohen, Habeas Corpus cum Causs -The Emergence of the Modern Writ,
18 CAN. B. REv. 10, 172, at 16 (1940).
3410 HoLDswoRTH, HIsToRY oF ENcLIsH LAw 128-136, especially 133 (1938).
See also note 78 infra.
3
SGroenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld. Raym. 454, 469, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1212
(1700), in which judgment was entered for the defendant censors of the
college. As regards the applicability of certiorari as a remedy, however, Holt,
after noting that a writ of error would not lie to this "Court newly instituted,"
insisted that ".... it is a consequence of all jurisdictions, to have their proceedings returned here by certiorari, to be examined here." He continued: "Where
any Court is erected by statute, a certiorari lies to it; so that if they [sic] perform
not their duty, the King's Bench will grant a mandamus." Yet he added, on
the same page, that ".

.

. it is by the common law that this Court will examine,

if other Courts exceed their jurisdiction." Of course exceeding one's jurisdiction
is not the only type of failure to perform one's judicial duties.
3
SSupra note 13, at 48.
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"Thereafter the King's Bench became inundated with motions
for certiorarito quash rates and orders made by Justices and
other bodies exercising administrative functions under semijudicial forms."
To this extensive use of certiorari and, to some extent, of the other
prerogative writs he attributes the goal-line stand of the common
law judges against the drive quarterbacked by Bacon towards a
separate hierarchy of administrative courts and a distinct system of
administrative law, a formation that produced teams undefeated and
untied on the Continent.
It is submitted that the shifting tactics required to meet this onslaught led to the confusion that obtained in England, and that prevails to this day not only in Florida but also as among the several
states,3 7 regarding the scope of the writ of certiorari, namely, as to
whether it is limited to correction of judicial or quasi-judicial action
already taken either in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of established principles of procedural due process, or whether it extends
to the examination of the entire record, and even of matters in pais,
and the correction of the decision at the hands of the court issuing
the writ. The practical administrative exigencies of the times, and
the charged political atmosphere in which the writ developed, tend
to minimize the importance of history in analyzing the status of the
various types of certiorari currently used in Florida. A "great writ
of review" can, after all, mean many things to many people.38
Habeas Corpus. The evolution of the writ of habeas corpus as
we know it today cannot be understood without differentiating
sharply between form and function. Functionally speaking, this writ
goes back, albeit but faintly, to Roman law. By his interdictum de
homine libero exhibendo the praetor could demand production of a
freeman privately confined.3 9 Jumping forward several centuries, one
3
7For a concise analysis, still useful, of the scope of certiorari in several of
the states see Newmark, Present Scope of Certiorari, 49 CENT. L.J. 406 (1899).
38 In Florida interlocutory certiorari under R. PRAc. Sup. CT. FLA. 34 even
means an appeal from a nonfinal decree on the equity side, although "interlocu-

tory wapentake" would be fully as appropriate and probably less confusing.
39
DIG-ST 43.29; cf. POSTE, GM INSTrrUTIoNEs 595 (4th ed., Whittuck,

1904). The Roman interdict, however, was in effect a conditional order. Disobedience was expected and was not punished by contempt; instead, in a later
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might at least hazard a guess, with Maxwell Cohen,40 that a procedure
more nearly akin to our habeas corpus may well have been known
in ducal Normandy before William I and his staff crossed the Channel.
In England herself the writs de homine replegiando, to "replevy" an
imprisoned person, and de odio et atia, to provide an inquest for an
individual "appealed" of homicide, and possibly of any other felony,
and to release him on bail if the "appeal" stemmed "from hatred and
malice," appear in certain of the copies of the Register of Writs in
the early and middle thirteenth century.4 1 The first, however, was
of no use to one imprisoned by the king's command, and the second
required too cumbersome a procedure. Both eventually fell into
disuse.
From the standpoint of form the writ of habeas corpus has an
English history fully as long'and twice as confusing. The words
habeas corpus have been employed in a number of writs. The ancient
habeas corpus, like its modem scion, served to bring an individual
before the issuing court; but the underlying reason was radically
different from the current one. The purpose was to have the sheriff
bring an individual in, rather than to release him from an accomplished seizure lacking just cause.42 The habeas corpus ad respondenproceeding brought for disobedience, absolutio resulted if the party to whom
the interdict was addressed could show that the conditions specified in it did
not exist, while condemnatto followed if he failed to do so; of. BucKLAND,
Whether the merits were
MAxurL oF Romx PrvATE LAw 412-418 (1925).
later tried by the earlier, cumbersome, formulary procedure or, as under
Justinian, by an ordinary action, the interdict was functionally a rather clumsy
show-cause order. The resemblance of this type of proceeding to the early
Anglo-Norman writ of attachment upon the prohibition, following upon disobedience to the writ of prohibition itself, is worthy of note.
40
Cohen, supra note 33, at 11. This excellent article is warmly recommended.
Among other things, it includes, at 198, the varying texts of the writ from
1214 to 1910.
41They are so listed by Maitland, The History of the Register of Original
Writs, 3 HAMv. L. REv. 97, 167, 212, at 114, 171, 175 (1889). The bailed
prisoner was legally in the custody of the person giving bail. By still another
writ of this type, known as mainprize, the mainpernors, as sureties, vouched
for his appearance, but he was not legally in their custody; see 9 Hor.Dswoarn,
HI'roay OF ENGLrSH LA W 104-108 (1938).
42
Jenks speaks much too broadly when he says, in The Story of the Habeas
Corpus, 18 L.Q. REV. 64, 65 (1902), that "... . the writ Habeas Corpus was
originally intended not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it." The
writ did not involve an arrest; it merely ordered physical production of the
person before the court.
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dum was in fact but a potent form of summons; when other means
had failed, the court issued this writ in order to get the defendant
before the court.
Offshoots developed. The ad prosequendum variety applied to a
reluctant accuser; the ad audiendum suum judicium served to have a
party brought before the court to hear judgment; the habeas corpora
ordered the sheriff to bring in a jury; and, later, the ad testificandum
compelled a witness to come before the court and testify. Although
the ad respondendum type was usually employed in civil proceedings,
43
it was used in a criminal prosecution in 1214 in TyreU's Case.
Two centuries later, accompanying the writ of privilege, habeas
corpus served to bring a defendant arrested by order of an inferior
court before a superior court, originally in instances in which he had
some connection with the issuing court and accordingly could, per-

haps logically and in any event effectively, insist upon being tried
by that court. In conjunction with certiorari it removed to a court

of common law both the proceeding and the parties involved in litigation in an inferior court. 44 At this stage the true prerogative writ
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, though conceived, was not yet born;
but early in the fourteenth century there appeared a very close relative, nicknamed the corpus cum causa.45 The bitter rivalry of the
431 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN Trin. 16 JOHN, pl. 115 (1214), 1 SETEN
Soc'y 67 (1887).
Tyrell was "appealed" of "announcing," or perhaps of
"prophesying" (de denunciatione), the king's death. Habeas corpus ad respondendum was issued to the sheriff to insure Tyrell's presence; and the ad
prosequendum was issued to get his accusers before the court. Tyrell had
previously "appealed" them of putting him in fetters and robbing him, and
alleged that their appeal was made "out of spite" (per athiam) in an effort
to nullify his appeal. The sheriff was ordered to bring in (quod . . . haberet)
twelve knights of the shire to certify (ad certificandum) as to the record in
the county court, the which he did. Tyrell's accusers failed to appear, however;
and, after taking testimony, the court ordered the sheriff in open court and by
writ (in banco et per breve) to produce those whose essoin, or excuse, was not
acceptable, as well as to produce accuser Coffin, who had simply failed to show
up, in order that Coffin might hear his judgment (quod habeat corpus . . . ad
audiendum judicium suum). In this one case, then, we find three clear forms
of habeas corpus and also a command that the sheriff "have" the knights in
court to certify, though the latter clause does not contain the word corpora.
449 HOLDSwonTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 109-110 (1938).
4
5The full name was habeas corpus unacuin causa arestacioniset detencionis,
hardly a model of classical Latin, but plain enough in any event. Holdsworth
places the origin of this type of the writ in the fifteenth century; see note 44
supra. Cohen, however, supra note 38, at 18, has found this language as early
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common law courts with the minor equity court of requests, the
admiralty court, the ecclesiastical court of high commission, and
especially the king's council, prompted the use of the writ to obtain
release of persons jailed by their orders. It was also a handy weapon
for freeing those imprisoned for disobedience to an injunction issued
by the court of chancery against a common law plaintiff and forbidding him to proceed. And so, around 1600, the great writ habeas
corpus cum causa ad subjiciendum et recipiendum, to "have the body,
together with the cause of detention" before the issuing court "to submit to and to receive" whatever that court should mete out, made
its way once and for all into English jurisprudence.
Although on some points the leading authorities disagree, the
following observations can be made with a high degree of accuracy.
First, habeas corpus was already in use early in the thirteenth
century. Second, it was a judicial writ, not an original, although
both the chancery and the common law courts issued it. Third, in
its inception it had little if anything to do with the liberty of the
subject; its primary purpose was to expand the jurisdiction of the
royal courts at the expense of the local tribunals. Fourth, although
for centuries it was used primarily in civil proceedings, it was not
confined to these even in its earliest days. Fifth, when the common
law judges, allied with parliament, were no longer good "king's
men," they began to aim the writ at his ministers and at the rival
courts emerging from the curia regis long after they themselves had
broken away definitely. Sixth, by the time the 164046 and 167947
statutes were passed the bench had developed the writ to such a
point that the perfecting hand of legislation could profitably finish
the long sculptural task. Finally, the modem additional use of
habeas corpus to test the legality of purely private detention goes
back, in English law, to the seventeenth century.48
Mandamus. Any thorough study of the early history of the writ
as 1341, citing Y.B. Trin. 14 EDw. HI, f. 20, case 12; cf. his 1388 form, id. at 198.
4616 CAR. I, c. 10.
4731 CAr. II, c. 2.
48
Cohen, supra note 33, at 35, places the origin of this use of the writ in
1604; and.Holdsworth, in 9 I-1STORY OF ENGLISH LAW 119 (1938), finds such
usage common half a century later. Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Common
Law, 39 L.Q. RE,. 46, 58-59 (1923), traces issuance of the writ to a private
individual to produce a person detained as far back as 1199, and regards the
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of mandamus remains to be made.49 The words mandamus or
mandatum est appeared frequently in early royal commands, as
one might expect, but their connection with the prerogative writ
of mandamus is in most instances purely verbal.5 0 This writ did
not acquire significant stature until Sir Edward Coke, and later Holt,
chief justice under William and Mary, set its basic modern characteristics. In the leading case zl the king's bench, in a writ attested
by Coke himself, ordered the mayor and commonalty of Plymouth
to restore capital burgess Baggs to his office or to show good cause
for his removal. Upon an unsatisfactory explanation the peremptory
writ followed.
From these humble beginnings as a writ of restitution to office
it gradually expanded into a potent weapon not only for ordering
admission to "packed" municipal corporations but also for enforcing
exercise of jurisdiction by inferior tribunals wrongfully declining
it, and finally for compelling performance of ministerial duties generally. Mandamus issued in the discretion of the court, upon application by the subject. Although Jenks failed to find it as one of
the original writs, 52 Maitland lists it among those set forth in an
early thirteenth century copy of the Register of Original Writs;53
and de Smith cites one example of such a writ in the same general
54
period and mentions a case reference to still another.
Prohibition. The writ of prohibition, one of the oldest of the
prerogative writs, goes back functionally to the twelfth century,
and was in wide use in the thirteenth. 55 It served primarily to
examples that be gives as "an elementary form" of habeas corpus ad subjiciendur.
49An informative general Note on the writ appears in 20 IOWA L. REv. 667

(1935).
5

°See note 10 supra; cf. de Smith, supra note 13, at 50; Jenks, supra note 12,
at 530.
51
Bagg's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (1615).
52 Supra note 12, at 529, 533.
53
Supra note 41, at 111, 115, 171 (mandamus to a bishop to admit a presentee,
in which event common, not ecclesiastical, law governed).
54 Supra note 13, at 50, n.82, citing Close Rolls, 6 Enw. II, m. 8 (1313) (to
mayor and commonalty of Bristol to restore certain burgesses to the liberty of
the city and to their goods), and Dr. Widdrington's Case, 1 Lev. 23 (temp.
Enw. II) (to restore fellows of a college to fellowships of which they had been

unlawfully deprived).
55
Norma Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian, 20 MiNN. L. REv.
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prevent a rival court, deemed inferior by the royal courts, from
proceeding in a matter over which it lacked jurisdiction. The writ
appears frequently in the early Register of Writs56 as an original

issued out of the chancery; but instead of initiating a proceeding
it stopped one. For the cing or the subject it issued "of course."
At its inception it was addressed to the judge or judges alone, but
shortly thereafter a complementary writ, addressed to the adverse
party, could be obtained along with the one directed to the judge.
One of the great rivals of the king's courts, and certainly the
most formidable, was the court christian. Its jurisdiction embraced
not only administration of its own personnel and property but also
matters of religion generally, defamation, domestic relations, ecclesiastical annuities, and debts and chattels derived from marriage or
via testamentary bequest. The penalty of excommunication exerted
a pressure by no means purely spiritual; grave civil disabilities
and even imprisonment followed this holy ban, along with social
disgrace.
As might be expected, jurisdictional conflicts arose, particularly
as regards lay fees, advowsons, 57 and secular debts and chattels.
Pursuit of a thief into the geographical "liberty" of a bishop produced another type of overlap. 5 Furthermore, at a time when
holding court was a lucrative source of revenue in the form of
fees, fines and forfeitures, and when the clergy assumed the right
to discipline its members for even civil offenses, disobedience to
the writ of prohibition was common. Among the ecclesiastics themselves some were loyal to the old Anglican Catholicism, others to
disputes over authority to make
the imported Roman type;" 6and
0
appointments were inevitable.
Disobedience to the writ of prohibition constituted a ground for
272, n.3 (1986), citing Abbot Walter v. Bishop of Chichester (1148), Bigelow,
PLAcrrA ANcLo-NoRiMANNICA 156. This article is well worth the time of any
reader interested in the early history of prohibition.
5
6Maitland, supra note 41, at 114, 170, 173, 174, 221 (1899).
5
7An advowson was the right of a person, or at times of a manor, to present
to a church or benefice an individual to fill a specified ecclesiastical position.
GsSee Sayle's Introduction to 57 SELD=EN Soc'Y li-liv, especially lii (1938).
5
gFor an account of such internal struggles, as well as for a scholarly historical survey of the Anglican church and the influence of the Roman church
on it, see DAwVLEY, Cm-rMmns iN CHxmcH HISTORY (1951) passim, especially
c. 3, c. 4 at 133-134, 152, 156, 160-161, 163-167, 175-176.
G9Instanes are set forth in 57 SyrDEN Soc'y liii-liv (1938).
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obtaining an original writ of attachment on the prohibition."' Not
only had the king suffered an encroachment upon the royal prerogative, but the subject had also been injured by an illegal proceeding. Defenses were numerous and successful, however. The
defendant in the attachment action might plead temporary delay
or illness as his essoin, or excuse, for failure to appear. Or he
might deny having received the writ of prohibition in the first
place. Again, he might plead that the subject matter of the prohibited proceeding was in actual fact ecclesiastical; after all, there
was no rule nisi or alternative writ, and any applicant with the
price in his pocket could buy the writ. Technical exceptions,
familiar to the modern pleader, could be made; and if the purchaser of the writ had appealed within the court christian hierarchy
he was estopped from successfully maintaining prohibition. A
victory for the defendant resulted in his going "quit" and in the
plaintiff's being fined.
Causes naturally arose involving both secular and lay matters,
as in the case of a parson claiming in one proceeding both a
strictly ecclesiastical annuity and a secular item of debt."2 In
such event the prohibition applied to the secular portion of the
claim; in other words, a partial excess of jurisdiction could be
checked.
The king needed the writ on occasion, as for example to shield
his sheriff from prosecution for arresting someone within a churchman's 'liberty" for an offense definitely secular, or to protect "jurors"
of a royal court from priestly retaliation for honest but damaging
testimony. Suffice to say that, although by the reign of Edward I
the king was not attempting to usurp the jurisdiction of court christain, he nevertheless kept that tribunal strictly within bounds; and
as the church became more a spiritual and less a temporal and
political force the royal jurisdiction expanded into matters originally
ecclesiastical. 63 With the abolition in 1641 of the court of high
commission 64 the long process was complete.
Prohibition, however, was not dead; 6 it had at times been used
61

The writ of attachment is listed among early originals, Maitland, supra
note 41, at 114.
62
See Adams, supra note 55, at 285, citing BRACTON, NOTE BOOK No. 453.
63
See note 58 supra.
6416 CAR. I, c. 11 (1640).
65
For the leading English judicial analyses of prohibition in modem times
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with telling effect against other rival courts, such as the courts of
admiralty and, at times, of chancery. 66 The infrequency of its use
today is but a corollary of the gradual establishment of a definite
hierarchy of courts within one system, a clearer delineation of jurisdiction, and the sincere desire of most judges not to roam outside
the boundaries set for their respective courts by constitution and
7
statute. 6
Quo Warranto. A franchise, including the right to hold court,
was a financial plum in Norman England. No matter what else
happened,

someone

-even

the sheriff

-was

usually

"amerced";

and the total of these numerous fines for lesser offenses was considerable. Both spiritual and temporal peers obtained franchises
whenever they could; and these grants of "liberties," that is, jurisdiction or on occasion specified freedoms from royal jurisdiction in
certain geographical areas, were well worth defending in the king's
courts.68 Whether taking the form of the Abbot of Battle's liberty
of Wye or the liberty of the Lowy of Tunbridge successfully maintained by the Earl of Gloucester and Hereford, franchises were frequently asserted. The inhabitants of the famous Cinque Ports had
a franchise to be summoned before no one other than the king
himself, wherever he might be, or before their own warden at
Sheppery. Some of the barons of the Cinque Ports interpreted this
grant to mean that the king's justices could not even come into
these areas. One of the distinctive features of the writs later called
prerogative was that, unlike the lesser writs, they ran to areas of
this exclusive type.
One illustration from the Eyre of Kent held in 1313-1314 must
suffice, for reasons of space, to indicate the importance attached to
see Mayor of London v. Cox, L.R: 2 H.L. 239 (1867),

especially pp. 275-292

of the exhaustive opinion of the judges, rendered by Willes, J., upon the question put to them by the house of lords and specifically concurred in by the
latter; Forster v. Forster, 4 B. & S. 187, 122 Eng. Rep. 430 (Q.B.

1863),

especially the opinions of Cockburn, CJ., and Blackburn, f'.
66

See, e.g., de Smith, supra note 13, at 49; Hughes and Brown, The Writ
of Prohibition, 26 GEO. L.J. 831, 832-833 (1938).
07
An able analysis of prohibition federally and in several of the states is made
by Hughes and Brown, id. at 840 et seq.
GsFor an excellent survey see Bolland's Introduction to 24 SEEN Soc'y lix-bxv
(1909); cf. the claim of Richard of Hartlepool, id. at 53, to all fines and amercements of his men pleading in any of the king's courts.
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a franchise. 69 The dozen of Canterbury made a presentment that
the "city" had by custom enjoyed the right to try in its own court
those seized with stolen goods in their possession. The city, when
asked by what authority it claimed this right, answered "by franchise of infangthief"; but the written charter was found by the
court upon examination to contain no such grant. Serjeant Passeley,
for the city, argued that King Henry the elder had granted by his
charter the enjoyment of those rights possessed by the community
from time immemorial, and that this franchise had been enjoyed
by the community since before the Conquest and had been confirmed by two kings. Justice Sir Hervey Staunton ruled - to put
the Anglo-Norman in modern terminology - that a community, in
order to become an incorporated municipality, must obtain a charter
from the state, and that it cannot establish jurisdiction as against
the state by mere prescription."0 Passeley's valiant argument based
on the necessity of interpretation of the general terms of the existing written charter, which was produced in court, backed by long
executive acquiesence in such interpretation, apparently failed. The
case is doubly interesting in that the Anglo-Norman par quel garrant
and a reference to "the king's quo warranto" appear in the colloquy
between bench and counsel; quo warranto was specifically referred
71
to as the king's writ.
Inasmuch as the various local tribunals served a useful purpose,
even Edward I in his strong centralizing drive did not attempt to
gobble them all up; but he did insist on two things. First, he
wanted private jurisdictions to understand clearly where they stood,
that is, that the sole source of their franchises was the king. Second,
he wanted the delineation in writing; vague claims that "we have
always done it this way here" simply would not do. Checking into
the numerous claims advanced was accordingly a matter of no
small import; and the probe was the writ of quo warranto.
This writ began its career no later than 1278, with the Statute
69

The Eyre of Kent, 6 EDW.11 (1313), 24 SELDEN Soc'Y 130 (1909).
701d. at 131. The Anglo-Norman is clear enough, although the Latin maxim
quoted, perhaps in garbled form, is a puzzle: "quia comuna non est capax
libertatis." Another manuscript gives communitas for comuna, and still another
gives consuetudo. Regardless of whether the maxim means that an (unchartered) community lacks legal capacity to possess a liberty, or that custom is
not a basis for a liberty, the statement in the text of this article is correct.
7_Ibid.
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of Gloucester, 72 and there is authority indicating its availability to
private suitors even before that date. 73 Maitland lists it as an early
74
original writ.
In the sixteenth century the writ of quo warranto was largely
superseded by an information filed by the attorney general; and
eventually the process was opened to the ordinary citizen, though
not as "of course." 75 In its inception a royal weapon in the form
of a writ, quo warranto in its later garb of an information broadened, as it has in Florida, into a powerful aid to the private citizen
within its limited field.
Characteristicsas a Class
No one thought of classifying the isolated writs certiorari, habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as a single group
until Lord Mansfield, that eighteenth century chief justice with the
temperament of a chancellor, turned his powerful analytical mind
in their direction. By this time the damage, from the standpoint
of strict logic, had been done; but by the same token these individual writs had each grown to full manhood without the confining
influence of categorization. One might suggest, as a personal observation, that the gain was well worth the loss. Lord Mansfield
called them "prerogative" as a class; 76 and his protege, Blackstone, promptly and characteristically added the glorifying adjective
"high."77
The application of a few tests to the individual outlines just
sketched will now, we believe, eliminate certain factors as class
characteristics that these five writs appear at first sight to have in
common, and will indicate the anticipated common denominator
or two.
726 EDW. I; cf. Jenks, supra note 12, at 527. The statute was designed as
much to protect valid existing franchises as to eliminate usurpations, and the
claimants were directed to show before the king when he next visited the county,
or before his justices in eyre, ". . . quel manere de fraunchises ii [sic] cleiment
aver e par quel garaunt." Cf. 18 EDW. I, cc. 2, 3 (1290).
73
See de Smith, supra note 13, at 41, n.5.
74
Supra note 41, at 218.
759 ANNE, c. 20 (1710); see the opinion of Lord Reading, C.J., in Rex v.
Speyer, [1916] 1 K.B. 595, 608-610.
76

See de Smith, supra note 13, at 56; Jenks, supra note 12, at 533-534.
771btd.
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The "original-judicial" breakdown does not help us much: habeas
corpus was definitely judicial, while prohibition was just as definitely
original. Again, prohibition could be had for the asking, upon
payment of the requisite fee, while quo warranto could not; a
"discretionary" test advances us but little further. From still another angle, none of these writs aided the subject against the king
in the early days; in so far as some of them were available to the
subject they merely served to call in the king, in the form of his
royal officials, to help one subject against another subject. Or,
indeed, the king himself might use the writ against the subject. A
further source of confusion is the fact that, for example, while quo
warranto was in essence a show-cause order, prohibition was a fiat
command. Yet disobedience did not amount to contempt of court;
in the subsequent attachment proceeding numerous defenses were
permitted to excuse the disobedience. Finally, while quo warranto
initiated an action, prohibition stopped one, and certiorari either
did no more than secure information or transfer a cause already
in process.
From a positive angle, these five writs were of broader geographical extent than the other writs; the king's command contained
in them was realm-wide unless, as happened at times, he lacked the
physical force to back up what he said.
The one common factor that stands out, however, becomes apparent when we note in one paragraph what each writ did. If a
defendant refused or failed to appear, or if a plaintiff neglected
to proceed, he was forcibly brought before the royal court by a
habeas corpus. Jurors were similarly summoned. If a rival court
claimed a franchise to sit, or if some area or body claimed exemption from a portion of the royal jurisdiction, the claim had to be
established affirmatively in response to a quo warranto. If a rival
court overstepped its jurisdictional bounds, the king checked it by
a prohibition. If the king considered one of his royal courts better
equipped to try a cause in process, or if he merely wanted some
records, or if, later, he wished to review the action of some administrative agency that had strayed from the proper path in performing a function of a judicial nature, he issued a certiorari. And
if- although this development was probably the last to appear a royal servant neglected a duty owed by law to a subject of the
king, a mandamus reminded him in summary fashion to perform
it. Taken together, these writs constituted the great arsenal in the
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steady conquest of all rivals by the royal jurisdiction. 8 Small
wonder, then, that the subject, who for practical reasons genuinely
preferred that particular administration of justice in the earlier centuries, came to associate these writs with the king's prerogative.
As might be expected, rivalries developed when the judicial and
administrative offshoots of the curia regis became numerous. Growing
judicial independence did not augment the king's personal power.
He accordingly took sides - and sometimes he was definitely on the
wrong side in the eyes of his subjects. Whenever the particular henchmen that he was backing at the time lost, a prerogative writ that they
had invented for their own benefit, albeit with his approval, lost its
existence in the process; and an existing prerogative writ that had been
used effectively by the winning side became still more firmly entrenched, or was even expanded. This moulding of the writs was
always done in the king's name in the last analysis, however, because
any court issuing the writ, and especially the king's bench, regarded
itself as one of his courts. Indeed the king's bench constantly, and
with historical justification, claimed the personal touch, coram rege
ipso.
In short, once the royal jurisdiction became supreme and the early
need for the prerogative writs had vanished, they were turned to a
different purpose. Then, as now, they remained as potent aids to
the citizen in his struggle to protect himself from the ever-mounting
national bureaucracy that invariably follows in the train of centralized power.
As the five "high" prerogative writs developed, both the common
law champions and the "king's men" saw the publicity value of associating these implements with him. They acquired a glamour foreshadowed by their early history. The king, and after the Stuarts the
king in parliament, was the sovereign and the fountainhead of justice.
And the lack of this very glamour enveloping tried and tested special
weapons in the cause of royal justice probably explains the failure of
78The survival of this ancient and characteristically English practice of judicial
control of local government, in which process the prerogative writs played a
major role, is ably discussed by Oxford's Sir William Holdsworth, the legal
historian's historian, in 10 HIsTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 155 et seq., 243 et seq.
(1938). This does not, of course, justify the usurpation of control of state and
local government by the federal judiciary in a country with a written constitution
carefully delineating state and federal functions - despite the grasping attitude
of the Supreme Court of the United States over the past two decades. For this
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the newer and more frequently used injunction, and of the decidedly
pedestrian writ of error, to gain admission to this elite group.7 9
The development of these writs in England over the past century
and a half is beyond the scope of this article. An analysis of Lord
Halsbury's monumental digest, however, demonstrates a crystallization strikingly similar in the main to that effected in Florida.8 0 Technically habeas corpus alone remains as a writ; certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition have been replaced by orders, 81 and quo warranto
is now called injunction. 2 But the change is largely verbal; the
statute specifically refers to those instances in which the high court
would have had jurisdiction to order the issuance of the writ, or in
which an information in the nature of quo warranto would have lain.
In other words, we still find but the same old lance with a new
pennon on it. And from the standpoint of philology, a court order
today is as a rule still "writ" anyhow.
CURRENT FLORIDA STATUS

The extraordinary writs currently used in Florida practice and
properly so called number five: certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, and quo warranto. All are today regarded as common
law writs and as civil in nature, although historically they have not
always been clearly distinguishable by even these basic characteristics.
Injunction, the great weapon of equity, has itself been referred to on
occasion as an extraordinary writ, but such a designation must be
understood in relation to its context.83 In the sense that this writ,
potent as it is, should not be granted hastily or in routine fashion,
it can properly be classified as out of the ordinary. The connotation,
however, that it is either rare or unusual in nature is decidedly misleading; indeed, one can hardly think of equity without turning his
mind to injunction. In addition there is the constitutional writ of
latter see ROBERTS, Tim COURT AND TlE CONSTITUTION (1951) passim.
79See de Smith, supra note 13, at 54.
809 LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed., Hailsham, 1983); see the analyses at the
following pages: 838-904 (certiorari), 701-744 (habeas corpus), 744-804 (mandamus), 819-838 (prohibition), 804-818 (quo warranto).
81
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 CEO.
VI, c. 63, §§7-8.
821d. §9.
83
See note 11 supra.
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injunction, which is available to our Supreme Court but is seldom
granted. This article analyzes it later under separate heading, but it
is not one of the extraordinary writs either functionally or historically.
Individual ExtraordinaryWrits
The five extraordinary writs, properly so called, are now summarized seriatim. Detailed analyses, with full citations, appear in
the companion article; footnotes here are accordingly few.
Certiorari. The great writ of review is certiorari. Indeed, in most
respects other than date of origin it can be called the grandfather of
all the writs, and even so it is a fairly aged member of the family.
Taking the form of a directive that the issuer wishes to be "certified"
of the matter, it can sweep from our Supreme Court throughout the
entire State of Florida, whether to a lower court or to an administrative agency exercising the quasi-judicial function and from which no
statutory method of appeal is provided. The tremendous power and
reach of this writ is probably the reason for the rarity of its use in
its pure form. No agency of government engaged in the performance
of the judicial or quasi-judicial functions can escape review if it has
exceeded its jurisdiction or has failed to proceed in accordance with
essential requirements of law; and in the case of an administrative
agency, as distinct from an inferior court, the scope of judicial review
of quasi-judicial action extends to all errors and irregularities of law.8 4
Being discretionary, common law certiorari is not lightly granted,
and is not a substitute for appeal; but it lurks in the background as
one of the most formidable weapons known to the law, ready when
no other method of review is available. It may even issue before the
conclusion of the proceedings under attack, although such use is exceptional. It has played its most important role in correcting quasijudicial action of administrative agencies. The article on certiorari
presented in this issue discusses thoroughly not only the various
distinct types of this writ but also the divergence between theory and
practice in the judicial treatment of it on review of appeals to circuit
courts from civil courts of record.
In summarizing certiorari in Florida one must at least recognize
federal statutory certiorari, issued by the Supreme Court of the
84

See notes 152-155 infra.
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United States to state courts of last resort and the United States courts
of appeal; it can always be requested, is granted some fifteen percent
of the time,85 and nevertheless accounts for more reviews than does
appeal, which is of right but strictly limited in availability and
scope.8 6 Denial of a petition for certiorari is not an affirmance of the
judgment below; it merely signifies that less than four members of
the Supreme Court of the United States are persuaded that review is
advisable.
At the other extreme is certiorari under Rule 34 of the Rules of
Practice of the Supreme Court of Florida, which is not certiorari at
all but rather a sadly misnamed method of taking, on the equity side,
".. . appeals from interlocutory decrees as authorized by statute including orders or decrees after final decree .... ." It lies as of right;
no writ actually issues; and denial of this "certiorari" is a definite
affirmance of the interlocutory decree under attack rather than a
mere refusal to consider it.87

In addition Florida provides, and at least purports to regulate by
statute, the issuance and scope of certiorari in certain specified in8
5See Work of the Federal Courts, an address by Vinson, C.J., to the American
Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, printed in 69 Sup. Ct. Reporter v; see especially
p. vi.
86

BuNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

233 (5th ed. 1949). 28 U.S.C. §1257 (Supp. 1951) provides the only two bases
for appeal and the single but far broader basis for certiorari:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
"(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
"(8) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States."
87
Davis v. Strople, 39 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1949). It is worthy of note that the
odd label attached to this completely normal procedure seriously misled even
an able justice of our Supreme Court; see the dissent, which discusses certiorari
properly so called at some length.
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stances; 88 and common law certiorari is available to supplement a
deficient record, to quash judgments rendered in excess of jurisdiction
or in flagrant disregard of established standards of judicial procedure,
and to review the record made before an administrative agency, provided it is acting quasi-judicially, in order to insure that it has not
overstepped its jurisdictional bounds, that in its conduct of the proceeding it has met the requirements of procedural due process, that
its report and order are based on a proper record, and that it has
acted according to substantive law.
Habeas Corpus. This strong bastion of bodily freedom has been
described by our Supreme Court as "....

perhaps the grandest and

most precious of all the common law writs which this Court and
the circuit court are expressly authorized by the Constitution to
issue . ..."89

It tests the legality of detention of the person, and

accordingly it most frequently appears promptly after an arrest,
although it may at times be utilized effectively even after conviction.
In form it is a command, issued by the judiciary to the person
in whose custody the applicant is detained, directing him "to have
the body" of the detained before the court at a fixed time for the
purpose of certifying the cause of the detention. The court to
which the ex parte application is made may, of course, *deny the
writ in the first place if the application fails to show probable cause
that the detention lacks lawful authority. When the writ is granted,
however, and the required return is made by way of explanation,
the court has a choice of only three judgments: discharge, release
on bail, or remand to custody. The respondent need do no more
than make out a prima facie case in defense of the detention; and
a judgment of discharge signifies that he has failed to do so. Judgments of release on bail or of remand to custody do not constitute
conviction; they merely confirm the necessity for trial on the merits
in the regular course of the docket.
Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. Neither can it be
employed merely to purge an indictment or information that duly
charges an offense at law but is defective in some minor particular;
in such instance the remedy is motion to quash. Although normally
88

FLA. STAT. §§83.12, 850.641 (1949).
See Jones v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253, 261, 200 So. 856, 860 (1941). Brown,
in his dissent, presents in his usual fashion a masterful summary of the writ.
89

J.,
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directed to a United States marshal, a county sheriff, a district constable, or a municipal chief of police, the writ can be used to test
detention in an asylum or even detention of a child allegedly in
violation of legal rights, including particularly a decree awarding
custody. As might be expected, a state court cannot direct the
writ to a federal official, and a federal court cannot issue it at all
unless the detention involves some question within federal jurisdiction. Finally, of course, detention of a human body is a prerequisite; habeas corpus is not available either to prevent threatened seizure, even of the person, or to secure release of property
at any time.
In its field habeas corpus is most effective in maintaining liberty
of the body, especially when coupled with the guarantee of the
right to bail and the prohibition of excessive bail set forth in the
Constitution of Florida.90 The Constitution further provides that
habeas corpus ". . . shall be grantable speedily and of right, freely
and without cost, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension." 1
This bow to alleged emergency, while not unknown in federal law
under President Lincoln, has not, happily, been foisted upon Floridians by our own authorities.
Mandamus. The writ of mandamus, meaning "we command,"
compels performance of the ministerial function, that is, one required
by law and involving no discretion. The criterion is almost invariably the function itself, regardless of the position of the party'
obligated to perform it, whether such party be a lower court, a
cabinet member, a lower governmental official, or a private corporation.
This distinction between the nature of the function and the
nature of the office, so clearly made by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
in his famous dictum in Marbury v. Madison,92 was early discarded
in Florida in State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 93 in which the Governor
90

FLA. CONST.

Decl. of Rights, §§9, 8.

911d. §7.
921 Cranch 137, 170 (U.S. 1803), speaking of the third-ranking United States
officer: "It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but
the nature of the thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing
a mandamus is to be determined."
9317 Fla. 67 (1879).
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was permitted, by a split Court, to evade his clear legal duty,
involving no discretion whatever, when he refused to issue a certificate to the party entitled to office upon an- honest and legally
valid recount of the votes cast, his excuse being that he had already
issued a certificate on the basis of the first count-obviously fraudulent. It is noteworthy that the real basis of the argument was
that the Governor is above the law, regardless of the type of function
involved. The weak opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Randall was
demurely followed rather recently in Axleroad v. Cone,94 in"which
the Governor flatly refused to countersign a state warrant already
executed by the Comptroller pursuant to judgment of our Supreme
Court upholding Axleroad's claim. As a result, Floridians are still
the subjects of a state officer who is above the law even as regards
a duty specifically described and permitting no discretion whatever.
Such a condition in the United States today is, to say the least,
odd. But only the Governor, fortunately, enjoys this royal prerogative.
The statement that mandamus is confined to the ministerial function alone is accurate even as regards the application of this remedy
-to action that in its ultimate form appears discretionary. Mandamus
will not lie at all if the person to whom the writ is directed has
discretion to either act or not act; and, if he must by law act in
some manner or other, mandamus can force action of some sort
but cannot dictate the choice of the action to be taken. Needless
to say, mandamus is rarely of practical value in such instances unless
a battle, to be carried through at the appellate level, is impending
and a start must be made. An official does not enjoy being ordered
by the judiciary to perform a routine duty unless he is honestly in
doubt and wants the matter settled for his own protection by higher
authority; but whenever his action will almost certainly be contested
in any event, and speed is important, then even unfavorable action
may be preferable to inaction.
Mandamus also lies to compel official ministerial action by a
94137 Fla. 496, 188 So. 93 (1939).
Quaere: Why the distinction between
his gubernatorial acts as Governor and his gubernatorial acts as member of a
board or commission? In either event the duties are ex officio. Quaere: Were
he to commit murder, would the judiciary be powerless to try him, since he
would still be in command of the state militia? Quaere: If the Treasurer bad
paid on the warrant without the Governor's countersignature, how could the
Governor have prevented this action, assuming a truly independent judiciary,
since the merits had already been finally adjudicated?
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private corporation, or in other words by its officers in their official
capacity, the theory being that the corporation is a creature of the
state and derives its authority therefrom. But, like prohibition, the
writ is not available to compel action by a natural person in his
private capacity, for the reason that a private citizen as such cannot
possibly have a governmental function to perform.
To accept the stock adage that mandamus compels what prohibition forbids may well prove confusing. Admittedly both are issued
positively; that is, mandamus does not take the form of commanding a public official not to do something, and prohibition does not
forbid him to refrain from doing something. But mandamus is
largely used against executives or administrative agencies and is
confined to the ministerial function, while prohibition relates to the
judicial function or the quasi-judicial function and accordingly is
employed primarily within the judicial family. The nature of the
function is the important test; and from this standpoint the two
writs are used in radically different fields of governmental action.
Mandamus is not a panacea; and particular attention is called
to the rather strict limitations on its issuance, as set forth in the
companion article on this writ.
Prohibition. Of the five extraordinary writs prohibition is probably the least difficult to understand, primarily because its scope
is narrow and also because in its historical development it has
wandered about less than have the others. It prohibits judicial or
quasi-judicial action in excess of jurisdiction, whether the excess
be total or partial in relation to the cause. It does not extend to
any other kind of action, and of course is unavailable against a
private citizen for this reason.
It is not a substitute for appeal in correcting an error of law
below unless the error happens to be illegal assumption of jurisdiction. 95 Neither can it be used to prevent anticipated abuse of
95

The propriety of prohibition was very recently raised in State ex rel. Raines
v. Grayson, 55 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1951), the opinion in which appeared after the
thorough article on prohibition in this issue had gone to press. It is submitted
that, since the conviction of bribery in the criminal court of record depended
upon the interpretation of FLA. STAT. §932.29 (1949) and the immunity granted
by it as a matter of substantive law, the proper remedy was appeal. In any
event the rule nisi on the suggestion was discharged, and the Court carefully
avoided giving any reason for having granted the rule in the first place.
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discretion, as distinct from judicial or quasi-judicial action in a
matter beyond the scope of authority to act at all.9 6 Furthermore,

once the action has been taken a writ of prohibition comes too late;
it obviously cannot prevent what has already been done. In its
usual form it issues from a higher court to an inferior court or
judge,9 7 inasmuch as the issuing court must have authority over the
body or individual to whom the writ is issued.
Quo Warranto. This writ, for historical reasons, still bears a
criminal form even though today it is definitely civil in nature.
Meaning "by what authority," it tests the right to title to public
office, including the title of nominee or official of a legally qualified
political party, the right either to possess a franchise or to exercise an
admittedly valid franchise in a certain manner, and the right to
title to office in a domestic "private" corporation, which though
not acting governmentally is nevertheless a creature of the State
of Florida by virtue of its charter, or articles of incorporation.
The writ is brought by the state on the relation of someone, usually
our Attorney General; but, if he cannot be persuaded to apply for
it, any private citizen with a specific personal interest in the
alleged usurpation of the office or franchise, whether he be a
claimant of the former or adversely affected by the existence or
misuse of the latter, can institute the action as relator. The judgment either quashes the writ or ousts the officeholder or holder of
the franchise. In this latter instance the judgment of ouster may
be partial or total; that is, it may forbid exercise of the franchise
in a certain manner, or it may proscribe any and all action thereunder on the ground that the purported franchise does not exist.
Three words of caution may prove helpful, even in a summary.
The first is that both the effect of the judgment and the burden
of proof are closely connected with the capacity of the relator;
and the detailed explanation of the various effects and burdens
set forth in the companion article dealing with quo warranto in
OGThe remedy, when the function is judicial or quasi-judicial, is to wait
until such abuse of discretion materializes, then to object if necessary, and then
to appeal or petition for certiorari, as the case may be; e.g., White v. State
ex rel. Johnson, 160 Fla. 965, 966, 37 So.2d 580, 581 (1948): "Jurisdiction
naturally includes the power to err, which of course is not to be anticipated ......
97
Whenever disqualification of a particular judge is involved, the writ issues
to him personally, as explained in the companion article on this writ.
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detail should be noted carefully. The second, which applies to
legal attacks on the incumbent of an office, is that the title itself
must be the matter at issue; without dispute as to title another
remedy is available, but not quo warranto. The third matter to
bear in mind is that in quo warranto, as in prohibition, the mere
anticipation of abuse of discretion does not authorize issuance of
the writ. 98 If title to the office or franchise is clear, misuse of
discretion must be either corrected in some other fashion, as by
appeal or certiorari, after it occurs, or checked in advance by injunction in the event of imminent threat of illegal action for which
no adequate remedy at law exists.

Procedure
Issuance of the extraordinary writs is confined by our organic
law to the Supreme Court of Florida, 99 the various circuit courts, 100
now sixteen, 1 1 and the Court of Record in and for Escambia
County, 1 2 which is most readily visualized as an extra circuit court
with respect to original jurisdiction except that it can neither try
a capital case nor summon and empanel a grand jury. 1' 3 In addi98

State ex rel. Landis v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 So. 651 (19.34); see also

note 96 supra.
99

FLA. CONqST.

1l0d. §11.

Art. V, §5.

1011d. §§45, 48. Monroe County became the sixteenth judicial circuit by
amendment adopted in 1950. Note: This is the second §48 of Art. V. It
appears as §51 at 1 FLA. STAT. 19 (1951). Unfortunately we are currently
suffering from an epidemic of this sort of carelessness; and yet the Statutory
Revisor is not authorized to make the necessary correction for official purposes,

so he has to list both the correct number mathematically and also the correct
number legally, and then to add a footnote of explanation. Why not uniformly
authorize this official or the Secretary of State to do the numbering? A few of
the amendments to be approved or rejected in 1952 have sensibly left this
matter to the Secretary of State.
102

FLA. CONST. Art. V, §39; cf. §§40, 41, 48 (Note: This is the first §48;
see note 101 supra), which, however, do not affect writ jurisdiction. A further

amendment has been proposed by the 1951 Legislature, and will be presented
to the electorate in 1952. Its practical effect, despite duplication and lengthy
provisions that belong in a statute rather than in a constitution, is essentially to

abolish the Escambia Court of Record and to add another judge to the first
circuit. Whatever one may say of its draftsmanship, it is at least a step forward
in simplifying a state judicial structure rivaled by mythological labyrinths only.
1OSlbid.
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tion, as regards habeas corpus alone, any individual justice of the
Supreme Court may issue the writ to any part of Florida and may
make it returnable before himself, a fellow justice, the Supreme Court,
or any circuit judge. 0 4 The practitioner is well advised, however,
to apply to the circuit court in the appropriate area.
Factual issues should not be raised in the Supreme Court; 0 5 while
it has not denied its authority to empanel a jury it has repeatedly
insisted that it lacks facilities for doing so.10O It may appoint a commissioner, 0 7 but in most instances it will summarily dismiss the proceeding and relegate the parties to the appropriate forum. 0 8 In any
event, the loser in the circuit court or in the Escambia Court of
Record can appeal, as of right.10 9 In view of the numerous earlier
opinions, it is important to note:"10
"Review in this state by writ of error is abolished. All relief
heretofore obtainable by writ of error may hereafter be obtained
by appeals as in equity."
The tyranny of labels, so common to the law,"' has clutched the
extraordinary writs in its bewildering grasp. One files a petition or
application for habeas corpus, mandamus, or certiorari, a suggestion
of prohibition, and an information in the nature of a quo warranto." 2
A functional analysis may therefore assist the student, and perhaps
even a few practitioners.
Each of the five writs except certiorari is initiated by a request,
04

FA.

'OUR.

CoNsT. Art. V, §5.
PRe. Sup. CT. F"A

27(b).

' 00 State ex rel. Davis v. Avon Park, 117 Fla. 565, 158 So. 159 (Dec. 11,

1934) passim. Incidentally, almost two years were required to settle the procedure, before even approaching the merits; cf. this wavering battle, under
varying names, running through 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409 (March 10, June 2,
July 12, 1933); 117 Fla. 556, 151 So. 701 (Dec. 22, 1933).
lOTbid.; a circuit judge was finally appointed commissioner.
' 00 89E.g., State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So. 638 (1932).
2 Fr. CoNsT. Art. V, §§5, 40.
110
FrLA. STAT. §59.01(3) (1949). This change was not made until 1945;
older references to review on the law side speak, of course, in terms of writ of
error. Note the similar English draftmanship in abolishing formally four of
the prerogative writs while nevertheless retaining their content; see notes 81,
82 supra.
"See note 2 supra.
12 The reasons for these discrepancies are, of course, historical, not logical.
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whereupon the court either denies the request or issues what is in
effect a show-cause order. The party to whom the order is issued,
who is known as the respondent, answers in what is known as a
return; and the court thereupon renders its judgment on the issue
so raised.
In prohibition proceedings the court first issues a rule nisi, that
is, an order to the respondent to show cause in his return why a
peremptory writ of prohibition should not issue.' 13 If his explanation
is satisfactory the court discharges the rule; if it is not, the court then
issues the peremptory writ, which is an order to the respondent court
or judge forbidding absolutely any further proceedings of the type
adjudged in excess of jurisdiction, or even ordering dismissal of the
114
cause.
This same procedure applies to mandamus; but the superior court
may, if it prefers, issue an alternative writ of mandamus, giving the
respondent court or official an opportunity either to perform or to
justify his position. If respondent explains satisfactorily his refusal
to act, the alternative writ is quashed; otherwise the peremptory writ
of mandamus issues, leaving him no choice other than to perform
the ministerial act in question.
In habeas corpus the writ itself is a show-cause order, and judgnient of discharge, of release on bail, or of remand to custody
follows upon consideration of respondent's return.
Quo warranto is likewise a show-cause order, and unless the return
to the writ establishes title to the office, or existence of the franchise,
or the right to exercise the franchise in the manner complained of, a
judgment of ouster results; and in addition, if the relator claims title
to an office and requests determination of his claim, the court must
make such determination." 15
Certiorari is different, although the anachronistic terminology still
employed belies this fact. Originally the writ issued upon request,
provided the higher court was persuaded to review the judgment
113 For the effect of FLA. STAT. §80.07 (1949), as well as for the detailed
procedure, see the discussion under the heading Procedure in the companion
article on prohibition.
114 The peremptory writ may be narrowed so as to forbid accurately what
the law proscribes; relator does not always get all that he requests.
1 15
FLA. STAT. §80.01 (1949); FLA. C.L.R. 58(c).
Attention is again called
to the companion article on quo warranto with regard to variations in burden
of proof occasioned by varying types of relator.
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below; the clerk of the lower court certified a transcript of the record,
thereby making the return; written and oral argument on the merits
followed; and the superior court rendered judgment either quashing
the writ or quashing the judgment below. Even a partially correct
judgment below was quashed in its entirety, leaving the parties where
they started except as regards costs, fees of counsel, and loss of time.
Today the petitioner must file his petition, concisely stating the cause
and the reasons relied upon for granting the writ,

"...

within sixty

days from the date of the proceeding, order, judgment or decree
sought to be reviewed." 116 With it he must file a certified transcript
of the essential portions of the record and also his supporting brief,
and must furnish respondent or his counsel with a copy of each, and
also of the petition, at the time notice of application for certiorari is
filed with the court clerk. The respondent has ten days within which
to file his brief, reckoned from the date on which he is furnished
with a copy of petitioner's brief. A petition for certiorari filed in the
Supreme Court is set down for hearing on a motion day; and the
cause is finally disposed of without oral argument unless the Court
117
orders further proceedings.
The attention of the reader is called to Rule 27, which is expressly
made applicable to all five extraordinary writs and to the constitutional stay writs. The following Supreme Court Rules of Practice,
governing each writ individually, are equally as important: 28 on
certiorari, 84 on interlocutory appeals by certiorari, 29 on prohibition,
80 on mandamus, 31 and 80 on quo warranto, 32 and 36(a) on
habeas corpus, and 83 on the constitutional stay writs."x8 The somewhat similar provisions of Florida Common Law Rules 54-60 apply
to circuit court procedure. 1 9 In addition there are numerous pro28(a). FLA. C.L.R. 55(a) makes the same proto
circuit
courts,
except that the original record can be used
vision with regard
instead of a transcript.
117R. PnAc. Sup. CT. FLA. 28; cf. FLA. C.L.R. 55. The companion article
on certiorari analyzes the procedure thoroughly; see Parts VI-IX, and also X
on interlocutory "certiorari."
118
In the 1949 biennial revision of Florida Statutes the Florida Supreme Court,
Common Law, and Equity Rules appear just before the comprehensive index,
in the second volume. In the 1951 revision the Statutory Revisor has wisely
shifted them to the end of the first volume, inasmuch as indexing problems
invariably delay somewhat the appearance of the second volume.
219By FLA. Co NsT. Art. V, §§11, 39, the 16 circuit courts and the Escambia
Court of Record are granted original jurisdiction in equity, and this jurisdiction
"OR.

PnAc. SUP. CT. FLA.
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visions scattered throughout the Florida statutes. These are noted,
and discussed to the extent necessary, in the other articles in this
issue. Accordingly a few random observations will suffice.
First, an application to the Supreme Court for any extraordinary
writ is normally heard on Monday mornings at 9:30, and requires
five days' notice to the adverse party and filing of proof of such
notice with the Supreme Court clerk. Copy of any brief required
with an application must be furnished to the adverse party. Oral
argument, when requested, is limited to ten minutes per side unless
one of the parties requests more time, in which event the cause is
set for a day certain and additional time up to the maximum of thirty
minutes per side is allowed. 120 Lengthy arguments are, of course,
not encouraged and are sparingly accorded.
Second, in mandamus proceedings the Supreme Court will not
entertain an original petition " . . . unless a state officer, state board,
state functionary, or some other agency authorized to represent the
public generally is named as respondent."12' Third, whenever a writ
of mandamus in the nature of a procedendo to an inferior court or
judge is sought, the data supporting the application must be in the
22
record and not merely presented in pais.1
Fourth, relator may, in proceedings in mandamus, prohibition,
and quo warranto before the Supreme Court, file a reply brief within
ten days of the filing of respondent's brief on the return day;' 23 this
is really the first brief of relator.
Fifth, if in requesting habeas corpus "the validity of any statute,
criminal law proceeding, or conviction is attacked," notice must be
given to the Attorney General in an application to the Supreme Court
or to a justice thereof, or, as regards circuit court and Escambia Court
of Record applications, "to the prosecuting attorney of the court
wherein the statute under attack is being applied, the criminal law
is expressly made "exclusive."

The familiar injunction in equity is available

to them
alone.
120See R. PRAc. Sup.

CT. FLA. 27 regarding the preceding portion of this
paragraph. See also R. 21, relating to oral argument on appeal and the requisite
application therefor. Cf. FLA. C.L.R. 54.
1211R. PAC. Sup. CT. FLA. 80(d).
122Bishop v. Chillingworth, 114 Fla. 286, 154 So. 254 (1934) (sustaining
demurrer to alternative writ, with leave to relator to amend within 15 days so
as to incorporate his matters in pals into the record below).
3

12 R. PRAc. Sup. CT. FLA. 29-31; note the somewhat different provisions in
FLA. C.L.R. 56-68 as to circuit court procedure.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4 [1951], Art. 1

ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS
proceeding is being maintained, or the conviction has occurred." 12 4
Sixth, on review by the Supreme Court of a judgment entered below
in habeas corpus proceedings, the special requirements of Supreme
Court Rule of Practice 36(a) govern rather than the general provisions of Rule 2.125
Seventh, certiorari alone has a fixed period within which application must be made, namely, "within sixty days from the date of
12 6
the proceeding, order, judgment or decree sought to be reviewed."
Laches, however, will be considered in mandamus and quo warranto
proceedings; 1 27 and of course one cannot deliberately acquiesce in
the act complained of and then ask a higher court to step in when
he later changes his mind. Furthermore the court is neither bound
nor willing to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus or prohibition,
or a judgment of ouster in quo warranto, if the relief sought is at
such time nugatory or impossible of performance; neither is it indined to grant relief by mandamus
or quo warranto when great
128
public mischief will result.

To reproduce the actual forms of each writ and of the subsequent
pleadings is beyond the scope of this symposium. Numerous Florida
cases containing such forms are listed by Dr. Crandall in his masterful
1 29
treatise on Florida common law practice.
Florida Source, Interrelation,and Relation to Injunction
Inherent and Constitutional Authority to Issue. The inherent
124R. PRAc. Sun. CT. FY-4. 82(b); see 27(a) re notice.

As regards circuit

courts
see FLA. C.L.R. 59(a).
125For a detailed analysis see Legis., 1 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 441 (1948).
B. PnAc. Sup. CT. FLA. 2 is sorely in need of clarification in this respect; note
particularly that FA. STAT. §79.11 (1949) still applies, though with appeal

substituted for writ of error, and that leave to appeal must first be obtained
from the judge that heard the cause or from a justice of the Supreme Court.
12GSee note 116 supra; FLA. STAT. §§59.02(3), 59.08 (1949); R. Paic. SUP.
CT. FLA. 84(a).
127
Laches are rarely imputed to the state, however; see the discussion under
the heading Procedure in the companion article on quo warranto.

' 28For an unusual situation, in which the peremptory writ of mandamus was

recalled, after issuance, by reason of a subsequent Interstate Commerce Commission order rendering obedience to the writ productive of governmental confusion and public detriment, see State ex rel. Davis v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 103
Fla. 1204, 140 So. 817 (1932).
129pAcTicE IN ACTIONS AT LAW IN THE CmIcurr CoUTs AN
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power of any court to make effective its valid judgments, whether
rendered at the trial level or at the appellate, is basic in judicial
administration. 130 This inherent power is of vital importance to courts
of general jurisdiction. In any event, however, the Florida Constitution expressly grants to all circuit courts and judges thereof "power
to issue" each of the five extraordinary writs, plus injunction, "and
all writs proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction."' 13 The Court of Record in and for Escambia County is accorded "the same power and authority to issue all writs as the circuit
court of said county and the judge thereof"; and the Supreme Court
is given "the power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and also all writs necessary or
proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." 32 As a result of
these provisions, which are over a century old in Florida, 133 the LegisoF FLORmA (Supp. 1940), familiarly known as FLORIDA Co~NNioN LAW PRACTICE.
See citations listed under each writ at 540, 559, 567, 584, 585. See also note
40 supra.
13OAn excellent discussion of the inherent power theory, as well as of the
doctrine of separation of powers, appears in the opinion of Vanderbilt, C.J., in
Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
Opposing arguments
are presented in the concurring opinion of Case, J. The broad claim of inherent
power to make all rules of practice is not fully applicable in Florida, however;
for a careful discussion of the Florida situation see Legis., 1 U. oF FLA. L. REV.
441, 443 (1948), and note the effect of FLA. CONST. Art. III, §§20, 21, Art. V,
§1; FLA. STAT. §25.03 (1949); Supreme Court Order of Nov. 22, 1949, promulgating the 1950 Florida Common Law Rules and Equity Rules. In this connection an amendment proposed for adoption in the 1952 general election will
if approved settle the issue with finality.
13 1

FLA. CONST.
1321d. §§39, 5.

Art. V, §11.

33

1 FLA. CONST. Art. V, §2 (drafted at the Convention opening in 1838, but

not effective until Florida's admission as a state on March 3, 1845) gave the
Supreme Court "power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and such other remedial and original writs, as may be necessary
to give it a general superintendence and control of all other Courts."
This
provision appears verbatim, except as regards punctuation, at the same place
in the 1861 and 1865 Constitutions. FLA. CONST. Art. VI, §5 (1868) deletes
injunction, adds certiorari and prohibition, and concludes with "and also all
writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."
Art. VI, §8 mentions, for the first time, power in the circuit courts and judges
thereof to issue "mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and all other
writs proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction," as
well as "habeas corpus on petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual
custody in their respective circuits." The current provisions, Art. V, §§5, 11,
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lature is powerless, quite apart from the concept of inherent judicial
power, to alter by statute the authority of these courts to issue these
writs.134 The problem, however, is still deeper than it appears to
be at first glance.
For one thing, the words "and also all writs necessary or proper"
have caused some confusion. In State ex rel. Watson v. Lee' 35 the
Attorney General filed an original civil information' 36 accompanied
by motion requesting the Supreme Court to order the Comptroller
to explain by what authority he contracted with a private law firm
to assist in the collection of overdue intangible taxes neither assessed
nor collected. The Court denied the motion on the ground that the
movant had neither applied for any specific extraordinary writ nor
laid a predicate for the issuance of one. Assuming the issuance of
a substantive legal issue, the remedy was, to judge by the rather
vague and very general pleading, a bill for injunction in equity, as
37
to which the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts is exclusive.'
After pointing out that jurisdiction and issuance of authorized writs
Mr. Justice Whitfield,
must be duly invoked by proper application,
138
added:
Court,
full
the
for
speaking
"This Court may adjudicate the legality or applicability of particular writs or procedure when applied for or used; but this
Court does not determine what writ or procedure is legal or
appropriate to give the Court jurisdiction on the facts alleged
in a pleading filed when no designated writ or procedure is
asked for. . . . When and not until jurisdiction is acquired can
ancillary writs be duly issued by the Court, and only when
'necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction."'
formed a part of our present Constitution, adopted in 1885 and effective Jan. 1,
1887; Art. V, §89 was adopted as an amendment in 1910.
' 3 4 E.g., State ex rel. Buckwalter v. Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 208, 217, 150
So. 508, 512, 514 (1938); see the emphatic statement of Brown, CJ., in Jones

v. Cook, 146 Fla. 253, 262, 200 So. 856, 860 (1941), in which, though dissenting for other reasons, he agreed with the premise of the majority ".

.

. that

the scope of such writs cannot be either contracted or expanded by the Legislature." See CRANDAL, op. cit. supra note 129, at 366.
135150 Fla. 496, 8 So.2d 19 (1942).
136
It was indeed "original," being of the "on these facts please do something" variety.
137See note 119 supra.
138
State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 150 Fla. 496, 501, 8 So.2d 19, 21 (1942).
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The position that the "other writs" mentioned in the Constitution are
ancillary writs is the obvious interpretation.
Just what jurisdiction, however, is conferred by the five named
writs; that is, what is the quantum of this jurisdiction? No solution
is contained in the statement that judicial writs ". . when duly
authorized and issued are the means by which the already conferred
jurisdiction of the court may be applied to particular cases"; 1 39 we
then have to ascertain the content of this "already conferred jurisdiction," which, however, the Constitution concisely grants by merely
naming the five extraordinary writs.
Apparently Maine's profound aphorism is not confined entirely to
"the infancy of Courts of Justice" and to "the early lawyer"; 140 and
Maitland knew whereof he wrote when he observed, after the great
era of judicial reform in England in the final quarter of the nineteenth century: "The forms of action we have buried, but they still
141
rule us from their graves."
In short, the draftsmen of the sections in the Florida Constitution
granting power to issue the extraordinary writs necessarily had more
than mere names in mind; and yet, inasmuch as justices and circuit
judges would be interpreting these provisions, definitions were quite
properly omitted as cumbersome and unwanted. But content was
unavoidably adopted; and that content was the substantive area
traditionally policed by these five procedural forms in Anglo-American law. The judiciary, by virtue of its practical experience in this
field as well as by reason of its exclusive power to construe the Florida
Constitution, is accordingly the sole judge of such jurisdiction. The
source of the jurisdiction is, of course, the Florida electorate speaking
through the Constitution, and amendments are always possible to
reduce the scope of authority later deemed excessive; but the arbiter
of the precise content of the grant is the bench. The extraordinary
writs, then, are at once the form and the content of this segment of
jurisdiction; in measuring it they set it, by including all matters
within the bounds fixed for each writ.

Interplay of Extraordinary Writs and Injunction. Each of the extraordinary writs, considered in isolation, seems rather severely cir"R9ld, at 499, 8 So.2d at 20.
140 See note 1 supra.

141EQurrY 296 (1909), reprinted in THE FoRis OF ActnoN
2 (1936).

AT COMwON

LAW
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cumscribed. The total effect obtainable by these same writs is striking, however, when they are visualized as a procedural arsenal,
especially if injunction be tossed into the fray. They do not, of
course, replace appeal, including the growing weapon of statutory
created for specifically enumerated situations from time
appeal 1as
to time 42 and the now obsolete writ of error on the law side; 143
neither, at the trial level, are they substitutes for the ordinary writs,
functionally known today as causes of action and embodied in the
familiar complaint. They are distinctly complementary; and, like
most special weapons, are not designed for use in routine fighting.
When needed, however, they are needed badly. A comparative summary illustrates what they can do in practice.
Beginning with the simplest, if judicial or quasi-judicial action
in excess of jurisdiction is threatened, prohibition is at hand. If
the threatened illegal action is of some other type, such as quasilegislative or quasi-executive, injunction stands ready. And if the
anticipated action is judicial but will constitute merely an abuse
of discretion within admitted jurisdictional limits, then, when it
approach is by appeal; no
occurs-if it does occur-the proper
44
extraordinary procedure is needed.
If the dispute concerns title to public office, including corporate
office, or the existence of a franchise, or some particular manner of
exercising a franchise admittedly granted, quo warranto goes on
the attack If the title or franchise is conceded, but an individual
or agency refuses either to perform a ministerial act of a public
nature prescribed by law or to move at all in exercising discretion when the law requires such exercise, then mandamus steps
to the firing line. If the legally prescribed act is of a private nature,
and no remedy at law such as damages or ejectment is adequate,
mandatory injunction lets go a burst, or perhaps its short-ranged
companion, specific performance of a contractual duty, will suffice.
If the illegal action has already been taken and is judicial, an
ordinary appeal is normally at hand when the actor is a court.
Even when such action is an exercise of final appellate jurisdiction,
that powerful weapon certiorari can be brought into play to crush
usurpation of jurisdiction or procedure at variance with the essen142 E.g., FLA. STAT. §440.27 (1949)
143 See note 110 supra.
144See note 96 supra.

(workmen's compensation).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss4/1

44

Miller and Adams: Origins and Current Florida Status of the Extraordinary Writs
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
tial requirements of law.1 45 When an administrative agency acts
illegally in performing its functions, administrative review may well
be available. 146 If so, it must be utilized; 147 exhaustion of administrative remedies obviously precedes resort to the courts, which are
not to be called upon until other corrective measures have failed.
14s
Again, the legislative body may have set up a statutory appeal,
which should of course be adopted whenever applicable. A new
remedy created by statute does not infringe upon the extraordinary
writs; it merely reduces the demand for them. Cutting into the
scope or nature of the extraordinary writs by statute is one thing;
creating an adequate remedy for a sector of the right-enforcement
front formerly protected by these writs is another. This latter
process merely brings up an ordinary weapon to cover an area formerly within extraordinary range only; it does not alter the extraordinary implement. 49 The writs themselves are always ready to
145E.g., common law certiorari was issued to the circuit court in Farragut
v. Tampa, 156 Fla. 107, 22 So.2d 645 (1945), in order to review its aflfirmance
on an appeal, specifically rendered final by FLA. COIST. Art. V, §11, of conviction of misdemeanor in municipal court. The important constitutional question
of the power of the Legislature to grant a municipal court the authority to
issue a search warrant was the decisive factor. The power was upheld.
146E.g., FLA. STAT. §440.25 (1949) (review by full commission of workmen's
compensation order of deputy commissioner).
' 47 E.g., De Carlo v. West Miami, 49 So.2d 596 (1950) (dismissal of bill for
injunction affirmed because of failure of complainant to seek review, per zoning
ordinance, of town clerk's interpretation thereof and his resultant refusal to issue
construction permit for apartment-storage building).
148See note 142 supra.
149 Contra.st, e.g., State ex rel. Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 143 So.
638 (1932), with Ex parte Smith, 96 Fla. 512, 118 So. 306 (1928). While the
Watkins case flatly overrules the issue as presented and decided in the Smith
case, in which prohibition was adjudged a proper remedy for preventing a
proceeding in quo warranto held inapplicable to the testing of title to Democratic
nominee for county tax assessor, the Watkins opinion distinguishes the earlier
case by interpreting the quo warranto information therein filed as in effect a
proceeding under an additional but restricted statutory remedy. In any event,
the Watkins opinion clearly takes the position that if the part)' wronged elects
a statutory remedy, as he allegedly did in the Smith case, he takes it with its
limitations as well as with whatever advantages it may have, regardless of its
name. But he is nonetheless free, whenever such remedy is inadequate, to
resort in the first place to the extraordinary writs to the full extent of their
scope as developed in the course of the common law. If his election of remedies
is erroneous, he cannot blame the writs, although he may justifiably complain
of a confusing statute.
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take over if the range of the new statutory cannon proves too short,
because their own range cannot be varied otherwise than by amendment to the Florida Constitution.
On occasion the use of common law certiorari may be prescribed
by statute. 50 If so, it should be employed; but both the Florida
Legislature and the practitioner must not lose sight of the fact that
the nature and scope of common law certiorari is not subject to
expansion or reduction by statute. In this connection a word of
caution appropriately applies to the use of the term "certiorari," as
distinct from "appeal," to denote a type of review at variance with
the set characteristics of common law certiorari. Our luxuriant
tropical species of this genus have already caused much confusion;
and creation of still others will inevitably make matters worse. The
maximum extent of legislative fertility is either exact reproduction
of common law certiorari - the which is superfluous - or the creation of some other remedy that is not common law certiorari the which is misleading when "certiorari" is engrafted on it as a
label. In this latter event the judiciary may find itself forced, should
it choose to save a statute otherwise unconstitutional, to construe
such type of certiorari as a mere statutory appeal. Alternatively it
might well declare the statute unconstitutional, thereby leaving the
aggrieved party without any ordinary remedy, and thereupon 'issue
the common law writ of certiorari as provided by our Constitution.' 5 '
Only one significant tactical operation remains for discussion,
namely, the correction of quasi-judicial administrative action that
is final and yet free from any specified type of judicial review.
The broader scope of common law certiorari in such instances, as
distinct from review of the action of inferior courts, has recently
been judicially affirmed; 152 and the sharp analysis in the companion
article on certiorari renders superfluous any further discussion here.153
It suffices to observe that common law certiorari, though not available to circumvent the Constitution by providing in effect a further
'50E.g., FLA. STAT. §212.16(8) (1949) (method provided for circuit court
review of ruling of Comptroller seizing, as contraband, goods and vehicles
transporting them into Florida when the importation is effected without permit
in violation of our sales tax law).
151 See notes 131-134 supra and textual discussion thereat; note 152 infra.
52
See American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Marks Lumber & Hardware Co.,
45 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 1950).
leSSee Parts IV, V thereof.
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"appeal" from one designated as final by our organic law,3 4 is
sufficiently potent, when aimed at quasi-judicial action of an administrative agency, not only to blast a maneuver executed in excess
of jurisdiction or in disregard of the basic procedural characteristics
of a fair hearing but also to rectify errors of law of the common
variety. 155
In short, whenever battle begins and ordinary weapons will not
serve, the skilled legal tactician has at hand just the special weapon
he needs if he will but reflect and choose the appropriate one. The
sole danger is the judicial proclivity, well curbed on the whole but
manifested at times, to overstress the extraordinary nature of each
writ individually and thereby to box off even the able practitioner.
If only one extraordinary writ existed the problem would be far
simpler. No one can legitimately complain of the established principle that each of the five writs, and injunction as well, stands in
contrast to the ordinary remedies and is available as a last resort
only. When, however, this principle is stretched to the point of
denying each extraordinary writ because one of its companions
might serve the purpose, the hapless attorney may well find himself cursed with a multiplicity of weapons and annihilated without
a struggle because he cannot as a practical matter use any of them.
The petitioner should of course select the appropriate writ in
the first place; and in most instances he will, provided the bench
carefully preserves the outlines of each. But in the inevitable
15 4

Art. V, §11.
See note 152 supra. The operation of the writ upon quasi-judicial proceedings of an administrative agency is well illustrated by a comparison of
Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930),
and Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 101 Fla. 1018, 132 So. 851
(1931). On the first review the Court quashed the order of the commission
for failure to consider properly the statutory privileges of petitioner, to a
competitor of which the order had granted authority to use larger vehicles, as
well as for lack of any substantial evidence in the record with relation to the
convenience and necessity of the public both as passengers of common carriers
and as drivers on the highways involved. On the second review, following
further proceedings, the writ was quashed on the ground that the second order
and supporting record were in proper form and of adequate content and exhibited no departure from essential requirements of law, procedural or substantive. These decisions were not affected by the unique provisions of FLA.
CONST. Art. V, §35, authorizing the Legislature to "clothe any railroad commission with judicial powers in all matters connected with the function of their
FLA. CONST.
155

rsic] office."
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borderline situations he should not be compelled to shoulder the
additional burden of eliminating all the other wiits while asking
specifically for one. 156 If he lays a predicate for that one, he is
entitled to it even though another is also applicable. In particular,
whenever the writ requested is denied because another is preferable,
the judiciary can properly be expected to give its reasons for rejecting the request; and such reasons necessarily include specification
of the unsought writ upon the existence of which such denial is
based.157 Only by clear and consistent judicial delineation can procedural forms accomplish their true mission in the administration
of the law, namely, to arrive at the merits accurately and without
delay.
CoNsrurr

oNAL WmT oF LNJUNCON

Of all the writs issued by the Supreme Court of Florida the constitutional writ of injunction is the rarest and least known. Issuance
of any extraordinary writ, regardless of its status in the hands of
a lower court, is discretionary in the Supreme Court This observation applies with especial emphasis to the constitutional writ of
injunction, sometimes referred to as a "constitutional stay writ," and
15 8
offered in very guarded phraseology.
The purpose of this writ is to aid the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The writ does not confer jurisdiction
in any sense; if jurisdiction does not already exist, this writ is
156

See, e.g., the famous Two Years War on procedure alone between Avon
Park and the Attorney General of Florida, cited in full in note 106 supra, espedally the initial dispute between Whitfield and Brown, J.J., as to whether quo
warranto or injunction was the proper remedy. Brown's view was initially rejected but ultimately prevailed; quo warranto was finally approved as the proper
procedure.
157
For an example of helpful discussion of the interplay of several of the
extraordinary writs, plus an ordinary writ, see notes 179-181 infra and textual
discussion thereat.
158R. PAc. SuP. CT. FLA. 83(a); cf. FLA. C.L.R. 60. The former provides:
"Application for constitutional or other writs necessary to complete exercise of
the jurisdiction of this court will be entertained only after the required notice
herein to the adverse party, unless such requirement be modified. No such
petition will be entertained unless an appeal has been perfected in this court
and then it must clearly appear that supersedeas will not completely preserve
the court's jurisdiction."
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unavailable. Its effect is to freeze the res pending appellate determination; the justification for its existence is the familiar principle
that the judiciary does not engage in hypothetical maneuvers and
takes such steps as may be necessary to prevent its judgments
from being sabotaged before they can be rendered with finality.
The writ is not an injunction properly so called, which the Supreme
Court has no authority to grant; 59 neither is it a supersedeas. Any
resemblance to either of these procedural aids, whether in function
or in title, is unintended and is purely coincidental. The writ
cannot be utilized by the seemingly astute practitioner to avoid
posting an injunction or supersedeas bond.
What, then, is it? Functionally, it most frequently appears as
a negative supersedeas; in other words, it suspends for the time
being the practical effects of a denial of relief below. This negation of a legal vacuum makes the writ somewhat difficult to visualize
unless one reminds himself of the fact that absence of relief produces an affirmative result: the unrestrained party is free to make
the move that he intended to make in the first place. Mr. Justice
Davis, writing for a unanimous bench, aptly described the writ as
follows: 100
"Thus the constitutional writ when issued in these circumstances is in its practical operation and effect, a supersedeas
of the Circuit Court's order denying a preliminary injunction,
which, being negative in character, can be superseded by an
appellate court by no other means than by an affirmative order
of its own."
159See notes 119, 138 supra; for an early statement of this position see Cohen
v. L'Engle, 24 Fla. 542, 549, 5 So. 235, 238 (1888).
16 OAnderson v. Tower Amusement Co., 118 Fla. 437, 441n., 159 So. 782,
784n. (1935). The constitutional writ was granted to appellant by the Supreme
Court to offset the chancellor's denial of interlocutory injunction despite the
absence of any challenge below by either motion to dismiss or affidavit denying
the facts alleged in the bill; appellant was required to post an injunction bond
with the chancellor, however, to cover costs and damages in the event either
of affirmance of denial or of dismissal or abandonment of appeal. Later, upon
confession of error by respondents-appellees, the order denying interlocutory
injunction was reversed and the cause remanded, 118 Fla. 895, 160 So. 523
(1935); accordingly, the cause having been disposed of, at least for the time
being, in the Supreme Court, its constitutional writ of injunction was thereupon
vacated.
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Even under the authority granted by the 1868 Constitution 61 our
Supreme Court found the constitutional writ of injunction helpful
when confronted on appeal with a defective initial pleading, despite
which the chancellor had appointed a receiver of the rents and
profits of mortgaged property.162 While agreeing with him as to
the merits, the Court held that the necessary equities justifying the
appointment should have been pleaded in an amended bill rather
than by mere petition following answer. Accoidingly it reversed
.without prejudice to an application to the chancellor for leave to
amend the defective bill and for appointment of a receiver; and
in addition it enjoined all parties from disposing of the rents and
profits until further order of the chancellor.
Under the current authority' 63 granted in 1885 the Supreme Court
has made use of this powerful ancillary writ on but few occasions.
In Cohen v. L'Engle6 4 it denied a motion for an order enjoining
prosecution of an action at law on certain promissory notes pending
appeal from the chancellor's order below. He had denied a motion
for preliminary injunction, designed to forestall further prosecution
of the action until entry of decree in a suit for accounting instituted
by the party already defending at law. The Court observed that
injunctive relief was not indispensable, inasmuch as any facts warranting injunction could be presented as an equitable plea in the
action.
The Supreme Court may, instead of granting the constitutional
writ of injunction, advance the cause and determine it forthwith
on the merits, whether by affirming the order denying injunction 6
or by reversing it and remanding the cause to the inferior court
for further appropriate proceedings. 166 Necessity for immediate
161'At. VI, §5; see note 133 supra.
62
' Pasco v. Gamble, 15 Fla. 562 (1876).
163
FLA. CONsT. Art. V, §5; see note 133 supra.

16424 Fla. 542, 5 So. 235 (1888).
165E.g., Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So. 328
(1932); Wester v. Belote, 103 Fla. 976, 138 So. 721 (1931); Jacksonville Elec.
Light Co. v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 229, 18 So. 677 (1895) (affirming denial,
respectively, of temporary restraining order against picketing adjudged to be
of a permissible type, of injunction against signing of county warrants to pay
for dredged oyster shell pursuant to contract found valid by Supreme Court, and
of injunction against construction and operation of municipal power plant pursuant to grant of authority held valid).
166E.g., Anderson v. Ocala, 87 Fla. 257, 99 So. 667 (1924) (reversing denial
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action must, however, be clearly demonstrated; request for the constitutional writ is not a mere tactical weapon for forcing quick disposition of a related issue that can be handled in due course by
appeal. 6 7 On the other hand, the Court may prefer to freeze the
res until it can hear full argument on the merits in the normal
68
course of its docket.
The burden of an overcrowded Supreme Court docket, again to

the fore, 169 is not new in Florida; 1'7 0 factual disputes should be

settled initially at the trial level in the locality involved. Furthermore, the constitutional writ of injunction is seldom granted; every
possible other remedy should be carefully considered before reof injunction against disposal of municipal bonds, issuance of which was predicated on illegal election); Antuono v. Tampa, 87 Fla. 82, 99 So. 324 (1924)
(reversing denial of injunction against holding bond election predicated on
illegal notice to voters). Cf. R. PRc. SuP. CT. FLA. 33(b).
' 67Note the combined effect of Tryon v. Miami, 146 Fla. 498, 1 So.2d 465
(1941) (writ denied), and Orr v. Gardner, 146 Fla. 501, 1 So.2d 466 (1941)
(motion to advance disposition of appeal in closely related cause denied).
168E.g., Barry v. Willard, 114 Fla. 800, 154 So. 843 (1934) (restraining
sheriff from selling property on May 7 in execution of judgment appealed, provided that the constitutional restraining order would terminate on June 4 unless
$1,179 of attorney's fees and court costs already taxed had been paid over to
the judgment creditor by that date); Stewart v. Thursby, 103 Fla. 1201, 137
So. 7 (1931) (forbidding any issuance of county warrants, payment of public
funds, or creation of public indebtedness pending disposition of appeal from
order below dissolving temporary injunction thereagainst); Astca Inv. Co. v.
Lake County, 86 Fla. 639, 98 So. 824 (1922) (forbidding county to cut down
citrus trees, pending disposition of appeal on merits, in carrying out allegedly
illegal project of building highway through appellant's grove).
' 69Today the Supreme Court of Florida has a case-load more than four times
the national average for the highest state courts; for details of the triple load
of a year ago see the address to the Florida Bar by Sebring, C.J., The Appellate
System of Florida, published 25 FLA. L.J. 141, 142-143 (1951). An amendment to be voted on in 1952 proposes to expand the membership of the Court
from 7 to 10.
17OAs far back as 1890, in Ex parte Ivey, 26 Fla. 537, 8 So. 427, the Court,
referring specifically to the crowded condition of its docket, summarily refused
to restrain the state board of canvassers from canvassing certain allegedly
fraudulent election returns made by county canvassers, and suggested that
petitioner handle the matter before the local circuit judge by obtaining a writ
of mandamus to the county canvassers if he could prove their alleged refusal
to perform their ministerial function of counting and tabulating correctly all
votes validly cast. Review by writ of error, now by appeal, could then be
obtained in accordance with the practical demands of efficient procedure.
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questing this unusual writ. In Wingate v. Mach171 the Court, while
asserting emphatically that its jurisdiction to issue constitutional
writs "... is not limited to those writs merely which are necessary
to protect its jurisdiction, but may extend to the issuance of such
writs as may be proper 'to the complete exercise' of its jurisdiction,"
nevertheless denied the writ with the following pertinent caveat:1 7 2
"... to interfere with the orderly administration Jf justice in
the Circuit Court, extraordinary relief of such drastic character
as that herein prayed for . ..should never be granted except
in cases of extreme urgency where it is made to appear to
the appellate court that the constitutional writ prayed for should
be issued in advance of determination of an appeal on its merits
in order that appellant may not suffer any irreparable injury
during the intgrim between the entry of appeal and the final
decision of the appellate court."
The general rule is that the constitutional writ, like ordinary
injunction, cannot be employed to restrain a criminal prosecution,
although it does lie, thanks probably to the "property' complex"
inherited from our English ancestors, to ward off threatened illegal
action against property rights provided infliction of irremediable loss
without issuance of the injunction is established. 1 73 Nevertheless
in Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Ferguson 74 a citizen, acting
pursuant to statutory authority allegedly unconstitutional, brought
a public suit in the name of the state to enjoin the operation of
"bank night" by certain theaters. He obtained an injunction from
the chancellor, whereupon the Supreme Court issued a supersedeas
of the injunction. Furthermore, in order to preserve its jurisdiction
completely pending appeal, it enjoined by constitutional writ the
concomitant threatened filing of criminal informations based on such
operation, giving as its reason the principle that a party invoking
171114 Fla. 380, 883, 154 So. 192, 193 (1934) (application for constitutional writ in conjunction with appeal from refusal of chancellor to appoint
pendente lite a receiver for business constituting major asset of estate involving
in its administration both a will contest and claims of creditors of testator).
1721bid.
17 3 L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1931, on rehearing
1932), an involved case centering on the Mediterranean fruit fly quarantine.
174133 Fla. 634, 182 So. 842 (1938).
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the aid of equity, even when such party is the state, must as
against the particular respondents sued1 73 rely completely on equity
to settle the matter. The Maxcy decision' 76 can be reconciled in
that the constitutional writ protecting property rights was predicated
on the vagueness and ambiguity of the statutory provision allegedly
applicable, whereas affirmance of the order below denying injunction against criminal prosecution resulted from an examination of
other and clearly worded, though allegedly arbitrary, provisions,
together with a finding that these did not violate organic law.
That the constitutional writ of injunction is not to be trifled
with is readily apparent. As in the case of the five standard extraordinary writs, disobedience constitutes contempt, punishable by
fine and imprisonment, and is not excused by a belief, however
sincere and even though ultimately sustained on the merits, that
the issuance of the writ was predicated on an erroneous construction of the law. 177 In the event of unpunished disobedience to an
' 75 This limitation is important; see the careful restriction of the Gulf Theatres
principle in Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 186 So.
538 (1939), in which citizen Jones, acting pursuant to statutory authority, filed
a bill in equity to restrain the operations of Merry-Go-Round as a public nuisance.
The chancellor denied a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed his
decree, and also refused the constitutional writ of injunction, despite the contention that a prosecution for felony was the only proper proceeding by which
to test the allegedly illegal conduct. The writ in the Gulf Theatres case enjoined
nothing on the merits, according to the later opinion, but merely held criminal
prosecution in abeyance till the constitutionality of the statute could be passed
upon by the Court on the pending appeal from issuance of injunction in the
chancery suit previously instituted by citizen Ferguson in the name of the state.
17 6
See note 173 supra.
177Economy Cash & Carry Laundry, Inc. v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry
Board, 186 Fla. 243, 186 So. 422 (1939) (desire to lay factual basis for prosecution of appeal to United States Supreme Court offered, on return to rule to
show cause, as excuse for flagrant disobedience of constitutional writ commanding the laundry to refrain from performing services for less than the minimum
price fixed by the board; fine of $500 and 30 days in Leon County jail imposed
nevertheless). Note that here the constitutional writ had been issued "to preserve the integrity of the temporary restraining order" already issued by the
chancellor. Quaere: Why was the constitutional writ necessary unless - and
the opinion is unfortunately silent on the point - a supersedeas had been obtained? Supersedeas "as of right," upon posting bond when required, applies
to appeal "from a money judgment or a final decree" only, R. PaAc. Sup. Cr.
FiA. 35(a); cf. FLA. STAT. §§59.13, 59.14 (1949). In any event, this case is
not to be taken as a precedent for seeking the constitutional writ as a second
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ordinary injunction, however, the chancellor cannot, on the theory
that he has been liberal in overlooking the contempt, increase punitively the damages to be awarded to the party in whose favor he
issued the injunction." 8 Presumably the same reasoning would
apply in instances of disobedience to the constitutional writ.
The use of the constitutional writ of injunction along with the
standard extraordinary writs is well illustrated by State ex rel. Deeb
v. Fabisinski.179 In April 1933 Deeb was arrested within the first
circuit on a charge of murder; in May he was released on bond
conditioned upon his appearance at the next term of the court. On
June 10 the Leon County judge, in the second circuit, committed
him to the state hospital for the insane. He was indicted for
murder by grand jury in the first circuit on June 15; on June 16
a justice of the Supreme Court issued habeas corpus returnable
before a judge of the second circuit. Allegedly the first circuit
judge issued a writ of habeas corpus on that same day ordering the
hospital superintendent to produce Deeb before his court on June
19 to answer the charge; but the record failed to show either issuance
or service of the writ. On June 17 the second circuit court remanded Deeb to the hospital; and on the same day the Supreme
Court issued a rule nisi to the first circuit judge to show cause
why prohibition should not be granted to restrain him from proceeding further. He filed his return in response to the rule.
After a lengthy consideration of the effect, in a criminal proceeding, of an adjudication of insanity by any court other than the one
having jurisdiction of such proceeding, the Supreme Court issued
prohibition on the ground that the appropriate writ to compel attendance of the accused was a capias or bench warrant, leave to
issue which was expressly reserved to the first circuit judge. The
Court observed in a dictum that mandamus to the superintendent
would lie from the second circuit court or the Supreme Court if
needed to compel obedience to the capias or bench warrant.
In addition, the Court issued the constitutional writ of injunction
by supplemental order1 80 for the purpose of preventing the first circuit judge from interfering with Deeb's custody pending disposition
of a petition for rehearing promptly filed with regard to the grant of
line of defense backing an existing restraining order.
17SHanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1950).
179111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207 (1933).
180111 Fla. 468, 152 So. 212 (1933).
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prohibition. Rehearing was denied on October 21, and the constitutional writ of injunction, having served its purpose, was thereupon
dissolved.' 8 '
In summary, this writ is neither the familiar equity injunction nor
a supersedeas. Rarely issued, it requires a clear showing of indispensability, namely, that without its issuance irremediable loss will
befall the applicant, that the law affords no other adequate remedy,
and that the particular circumstances require maintenance of the
status quo pending appeal in order to insure the legal efficacy of the
8 2
judgment thereon.1
CONCLUSION

Only an Englishman, or rather a series of Englishmen, could have
produced the prerogative writs. That tantalizing blend of illogic and
sturdy practicality that is their essence was firmly achieved even
before Holmes shocked the pseudo-scholar with his aphorism: "The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 8 3 Born
of strife - bitter strife in many of the decades marking their stormy
advance - they were beset by most of the crosscurrents and side
winds of their time. Sailing in their general run straight into the
wind, and tacking as necessary, they nonetheless ploughed steadily
onward, fairly constant in form yet shifting in result as social and
political practicalities demanded. As Edward Jenks remarked, in his
184
classic final paragraph, "All which is extremely English."'
In Florida, certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and
quo warranto, along with their next of kin, injunction proper and the
constitutional writ of injunction, have suffered - and enjoyed - a
somewhat similar fate. They have felt the varying pulls of the historical scholarship of a Randall, the thorough analysis of a Brown,
the exuberant expansionism of a Terrell, and the cautious, enveloping approach of a Whitfield, as well as the at times deft and at times
clumsy fingerings of numerous other justices, pulling on the sheets
and altering the course, often unwittingly.
The fact remains, however, that the extraordinary writs are to this
1l1111 Fla. 469, 156 So. 261 (1933).
82
1
Cf. the apt statement of Terrell, J., in Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v.
104 Fla. 407, 410, 140 So. 328, 330 (1932).
Mitchell,
1 83
THE COMMON LAW

1 (1881).

184 Jenks, supra note 12, at 534.
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very day a powerful arsenal in the hands of the Florida practitioner.
But he must use them with skill and discrimination; reliance on our
Supreme Court to steer him to the proper writ is a false haven of
refuge, for two good reasons. In the first place, the Court does not
always do so. In the second place, there is no valid basis for expecting
it to do so. When a practitioner accepts a fee from a client, he should
at the very least know his formal procedure. Admittedly the Court
could be of greater assistance by keeping the basic characteristics
of each writ clearly to the fore,' 85 and by avoiding dismissal of each
of them by turns on the nebulous ground that the writ sought is a last
resort and that one of the others might conceivably be available;' 86
but in the final analysis, even though the judiciary cons the writs,
the navigator of the case is the practitioner.
We have outlined the major characteristics of the extraordinary
writs individually; we have noted what they can legitimately be said
to have in common as a class; and we have endeavored to present
enough of their lives to explain their reputation. Extraordinary they
are in name; and extraordinary they will remain in practice, for the
very reason that they do not come into play unless none of the
standard remedies is available. A variable minus an invariable
necessarily leaves a variable; and especially is this true when the
seeming invariable itself is not absolutely such. In other words, when
the rather sharply delineated ordinary remedies - and not all of even
these segments of procedure are completely crystallized - are subtracted from the entire procedural arsenal required to give practical
effect to the ever-shifting mass of rights evoked in the law by forces
from outside, then the residuary remedies must be flexible.' 87 One
should not expect to find fully standardized characteristics and set
formations in a special class deliberately reserved for tactical emergencies. The gain achieved by such reinforcements in the continuous
struggle to match rights with remedies is, however, well worth the
price paid in occasional confusion.' 88 Perhaps the outstanding tra285E.g., compare the muddled treatment of mandamus in State ex rel. Pinellas
Kennel Club, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 116 Fla. 148, 156 So. 817 (1984),
with the later clear and accurate analysis in State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 121
Fla. 515, 538, 164 So. 199, 207 (1935).
' 86See, e.g., notes 106, 156 supra.
1s7Cf. Jackson, J., in Ex parte Fahey, 832 U.S. 258, 260 (1947): "As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes."

28SCf. Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the Supreme Court since Ex parte
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dition of the Anglo-American judiciary, aside from its moral and
intellectual integrity, is its ability to meet each new factual thrust
head-on with procedural reserves called up for the occasion and
selected because of their capacity to cope with it. The heavy cruisers
of these hard-striking elite are the extraordinary writs.
And here we halt, with one final quotation. As Mr. Chief Justice
Ellis once confessed, in a surprising burst of benchly candor while
addressing the Florida State Bar Association some two decades ago:'8s
"The fear of testing your patience to the breaking point constantly warns me to bring my paper to an end. I will do so with
this suggestion. Somewhere among the crevices and in the secret
places of verbal excesses often found in judicial utterances the
truth lies hidden."
Most probably it will never be seized; but it can with effort be surrounded. At this point, since any individual - even a lawyer - will
hoist himself by his own petard if he but writes long enough, we turn
the reader over to the development in Florida of the extraordinary
writs, and of injunction, as individual implements. Detailed analyses
appear in the following several articles in this issue, with the exposition of habeas corpus following in a future issue.

Peru, 51 COL. L. REV. 977, 991-992 (1951), an able exposition of the swing in
the theory underlying issuance from "power" to "discretion," this discretion, however, not being unlimited.
1892 FLA. STATE BAR Ass'N L.J., June 1928, p. 35; to the same effect see
Terrell, C.J., in Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 282,
186 So. 538, 540 (1939).
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